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This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure Rule 23, and with it, the advent of the modern class action. 
As the fiftieth anniversary approached, many scholars, including myself, said 
that class actions were dead, dying, or headed for a zombie state.1 Many of 
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1 See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 163 (2015) (seeing 
“every reason to believe that businesses will eventually be able to eliminate virtually all class actions 
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the Supreme Court’s recent class action cases all but confirmed that view.2 In 
just the last six years, the Supreme Court ratcheted up the requirements for 
class certification under Rule 23 in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes and Comcast v. 
Behrend, increasing the cost and difficulty of obtaining certification. And, in 
a series of cases, the Court permitted the use of class action prohibitions in 
arbitration contracts, thus eliminating a swath of class actions and, often, the 
underlying claims themselves. The Court’s language in these cases also 
tracked stock arguments against the class action,3 leaving the distinct 
impression that the Roberts Court was on a mission to diminish or destroy 
the class action procedure. 
But a funny thing happened on the way to the funeral: just as the 
obituaries for the class action were being written, the Supreme Court issued 
a series of decisions that breathed new life into it. In Halliburton Co. v. Erica 
P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II)4 and Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement 
Plans & Trust Funds,5 the Court reaffirmed the fraud-on-the-market theory, a 
critical tool in securities class actions.6 In Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo,7 the 
Court vindicated the use of statistical proof to satisfy Rule 23 requirements, 
distancing itself from strong suggestions in prior cases that individualized 
 
that are brought against them”); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total 
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005) (predicting that, “with a handful 
of exceptions, class actions will soon be virtually extinct”); Charles Silver & Maria Glover, Zombie 
Class Actions, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 8, 2011, 10:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/zombie-
class-actions/ [https://perma.cc/W7RU-6LC6] (describing the class action’s “zombie potential” to 
survive, but stripped of its capacity to give value to claimants). 
2 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (upholding the 
validity of a contractual waiver of class arbitration); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 
(2013) (holding that “[r]espondents’ class action was improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(3)”); 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 357 (2011) (concluding that plaintiffs’ statistical proof 
of pay disparity flunked Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336, 352 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted a 
state rule that “condition[ed] the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availability 
of classwide arbitration procedures”). 
3 See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686-87 (2010) 
(describing the consequences of class action arbitration and litigation). 
4 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
5 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
6 See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2407 (declining to set aside the rebuttable presumption of 
reliance that permits securities-fraud plaintiffs to proceed as a class (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224 (1988)); Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1193 (reaffirming Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory and 
noting that, while fraud on the market “can be invoked by any Rule 10b-5 plaintiff, the doctrine has 
particular significance in securities-fraud class actions” since it “facilitates class certification by 
recognizing a rebuttable presumption of classwide reliance” (citations omitted)). 
7 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1049 (2016). 
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proof requirements would doom class certification.8 And the language in 
these cases tracked stock arguments in favor of class actions.9 
To paraphrase Mark Twain, the rumors of the class action’s death now 
seem greatly exaggerated. But the Court’s class action decisions raise a new 
and perhaps more vexing question. If the Court is not fully intent on 
destroying the class action, what drives its seemingly disparate decisions? Do 
they reflect an anti–class action agenda losing steam, as Professor Coffee has 
suggested?10 Was the unbridled anti–class action agenda an illusion to begin 
with? Or is there a deeper explanation for these decisions?  Part I of this 
Article demonstrates that the Court’s “pro–class action” decisions cannot be 
easily reconciled with their “anti–class action” counterparts through 
traditional means—neither through straightforward applications of Rule 23, 
nor precedent, nor particular case facts. But Part II posits that the Court’s 
seemingly disparate class action cases can still be rationalized. To do so, 
however, one must look past the procedural veneer and consider the 
underlying substantive rules and remedial regimes at stake. Indeed, a key 
question presented in each case—notwithstanding what appears in the 
petitions for writs of certiorari—is whether the Court will embrace an 
interpretation of a substantive rule that has the effect of facilitating the 
availability of the class action. The Court’s ultimate answer reflects a 
composite judgment about the substantive rule at issue and its implications 
for the availability of the class action device. Accordingly, to the extent one 
insists that procedural rules are, or ought to be, transsubstantive—that, “in 
form and manner of application, [they do] not vary from one substantive 
context to the next”11—the Court’s class action jurisprudence might actually 
be deemed “non-transsubstantive.” 
 
8 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2016) (finding that, “[b]ecause the 
Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 ‘to abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’ 
a class cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory 
defenses to individual claims” (citations omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012)). 
9 See, e.g., Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2407-08 (noting that “requiring proof of individualized 
reliance from every securities fraud plaintiff effectively would prevent plaintiffs from proceeding 
with a class action in Rule 10b-5 suits” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 
1199-1201 (dismissing Amgen’s policy objections to certification). 
10 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Supreme Court “Saves” the Class Action: Complex Litigation After Scalia, 
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 4, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/04/04/the-supreme-
court-saves-the-class-action-complex-litigation-after-scalia/ [https://perma.cc/ZR3L-HEHL] (noting 
that “Tyson Foods suggests that the Scalia Revolution, which arguably sought to do to the class 
action what the French Revolution did to the French aristocracy, is now over and has fallen well 
short of its original goals”). 
11 David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 
1191 (2013). For further discussion of transsubstantivity and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
see generally Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 
84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975). 
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This Article’s thesis has numerous implications—for separation of powers, 
judicial lawmaking power, federalism, the role of precedent, notions of 
transsubstantive procedure, procedural theory, and the nature and 
legitimacy of the judicial role, among others. The limitations of the Article 
format permit consideration in Part III of just two: First, the implications for 
the nature and scope of the federal courts’ procedural and substantive 
lawmaking powers under the Rules Enabling Act [hereinafter Enabling 
Act].12 And second, related implications for the nature and legitimacy of the 
judicial role in “procedural” opinions. 
I. THE ROBERTS COURT’S COMPETING CLASS ACTION CASES 
A side-by-side analysis of the Roberts Court’s “anti–class action” and “pro–class 
action” cases reveals stark tensions between them and leaves the impression that 
the Court is lost at sea in its class action jurisprudence. Start with the Court’s 
anti–class action decision in Dukes. Authored by Justice Scalia, Dukes made 
class certification under Rule 23 more difficult across the entire substantive 
landscape. First, in holding that a proposed class of female Wal-Mart 
employees failed to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), the 
Court issued a new, heightened commonality standard.13 A putative class 
must now demonstrate the existence of a common question that “is capable 
of classwide resolution—which means that the determination of its truth or 
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the 
claims in one stroke.”14 In evaluating whether plaintiffs have satisfied that 
Rule 23 standard, courts must now perform a “rigorous evaluation” of whether 
certification requirements are met, including an evaluation of any overlapping 
merits questions.15 
Second, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ proposed use of statistical sampling 
to estimate damages and resolve defendant’s affirmative defenses to plaintiffs’ 
claims of discrimination.16 Invoking the Enabling Act, the Court stated that 
“Trial by Formula” would impermissibly “abridge” defendant’s substantive 
 
12 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
13 See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 368 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the majority opinion as 
“import[ing] into the Rule 23(a) determination concerns properly addressed in a Rule 23(b)(3) 
assessment”); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining 
Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 463-75 (2013) (describing the heightened commonality 
requirement of Dukes). 
14 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. 
15 See id. at 351-52 (noting that the “rigorous analysis” needed to ensure compliance with Rule 
23(a)(2) “will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff ’s underlying claim” (quoting Gen. 
Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). 
16 See id. at 367 (disapproving that “novel project”). 
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right to “litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.”17 Whether this 
holding was meant to entirely reject statistical sampling as a means of 
satisfying Rule 23 in general was unclear.18 But the overall signal was strong: 
statistical evidence, particularly in aggregate proceedings, was suspect.19 
The Court’s holdings in Dukes are in considerable tension with two 
contemporaneous, “pro–class action” cases, Amgen and Halliburton II. Both 
cases involved securities fraud claims arising under section 10b of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 193420 and SEC Rule 10b-5.21 To make out a prima 
facie case for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must establish that 
they relied upon defendants’ alleged misrepresentations.22 However, in 1988, 
the Supreme Court held in Basic v. Levinson that investors are presumed to 
have relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation when they purchased stock 
because of additional presumptions regarding the integrity of the market 
price itself.23 That “fraud-on-the-market” presumption is critical to class 
certification—without it, individual issues of reliance would predominate 
under Rule 23(b)(3).24 Both Amgen and Halliburton II involved questions 
regarding what plaintiffs needed to prove, at the class certification stage, to 
invoke the Basic presumption. 
In Amgen, defendants argued that investors needed to prove the 
materiality of Amgen’s statements at the certification stage to invoke the Basic 
presumption and survive the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry.25 
Somewhat surprisingly,26 the majority opinion, notably joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts,27 rejected defendants’ predominance argument. The majority 
 
17 Id. 
18 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1027, 1028-29 (2013) (noting that the Court’s Rule 23(b)(2) holding in Dukes specifically “implicate[d] 
questions of Title VII policy”). 
19 See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
97, 133 (2009) (“The battleground today for aggregate proof in class certification centers on the use 
of economic or statistical analysis . . . .”). 
20 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
21 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017). 
22 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (“We agree that reliance is an element 
of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action.”). 
23 Id. at 241-42. 
24 See, e.g., Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416 (2014) (explaining that “without the 
presumption of reliance, a Rule 10b-5 suit cannot proceed as a class action”). 
25 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1188, 1198-99 (2013). 
26 See, e.g., Jonathan Stempel et al., Amgen Loses as Top U.S. Court Backs Class Actions, 
REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-amgen-ruling-
idUSBRE91Q0RL20130227 [https://perma.cc/UW9Z-DMXV] (observing that the Court’s 
decision in Amgen “breaks a recent trend . . . to narrow class-action litigation”). 
27 Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority opinions in Dukes, Comcast, Italian Colors, and 
Concepcion. It is likely that Roberts queued up the materiality holding in Amgen by conspicuously 
omitting materiality as a prerequisite in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 
563 U.S. 804 (2011). See Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, 
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reasoned that, because the common question of materiality is both a 
prerequisite for invoking the Basic presumption and a stand-alone element of 
securities fraud, the threat of individual issues predominating over common 
ones was functionally fictive.28 
That holding, and its reasoning, is in tension with both the certification 
holdings and the reasoning of Dukes. While the 10b-5 element of materiality 
is a common question, it is also an antecedent question to whether the separate 
10b-5 element of reliance can be established through common proof.29 
Materiality is, therefore, a common question about whether there is a common 
question. This state of affairs seems impermissible under Dukes. Plaintiffs in 
Dukes argued that they could answer the question of whether Wal-Mart had a 
particular sort of discriminatory policy—whereby regional managers were 
conduits for the discriminatory culture at the national level—through 
common proof.30 But that approach would not reveal whether the question 
apt to drive the resolution of the litigation—“why was I disfavored”—could be 
established through common proof.31 Amgen tracks this set-up. Investors 
argued that materiality was a question they could answer through common 
proof.32 Whether plaintiffs can answer that question through common proof, 
however, does not tell us whether individualized questions of reliance can be 
answered through common proof. 
Moreover, as Justice Thomas admonished in his Amgen dissent, both Rule 
23(b)(3) and Basic insist that certification requirements be met at the time of 
certification.33 If plaintiffs fail to prove materiality at the merits stage, the case 
ends there—but that means that the case should never have been certified to 
begin with. This is no mere formalistic point: certification itself imposes 
 
and Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 487, 518 (2015) (pointing out that unlike in Amgen, 
the Court did not address materiality in Halliburton I). Yet Halliburton I commanded a unanimous 
court, while Amgen did not. The likelier explanation, then, is that the materiality issue was splitting 
the lower courts, and its omission in Halliburton I helped Roberts obtain a unanimous opinion. 
28 Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191 (holding that proof of materiality is not a prerequisite to certification 
because, as an essential element of the securities fraud claim, failure of proof simply ends the case). 
29 See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1211 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that, under the majority’s reasoning, 
“plaintiffs will [either] prove materiality on the merits, thus demonstrating ex post that common questions 
predominated at certification, or . . . they will fail to prove materiality, at which point we learn ex post that 
certification was inappropriate because reliance was not, in fact, a common question”). 
30 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 344-45 (2011) (describing plaintiffs’ 
allegations against Wal-Mart that discrimination is common to all female employees). 
31 See id. at 352. 
32 See Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds v. Amgen Inc., No. CV 07-2536 PSG (PLAx), 2009 WL 
2633743, at *4, *8–13 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009) (evaluating plaintiffs’ arguments in support of their 
motion for certification and finding that all prerequisites for Rule 23(a) were satisfied). 
33 Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1213 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “[m]ateriality, at the time of 
certification, has been a driving force behind the [fraud-on-the-market] theory from the outset”). 
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settlement pressure before the merits stage. Empirically, it is the merits stage, 
not the certification stage, that tends to be functionally fictive.34 
These tensions between Amgen and Dukes cannot simply be explained 
away through traditional methods of case distinction. First, Basic stated that 
materiality was in fact a prerequisite for invoking the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption,35 so the result in Amgen was not directed by stare decisis; if 
anything, prior precedent suggests the opposite. Second, Congress has taken 
no position on the issue, so the differing opinions are not a product of 
legislative directive.36 Third, even if the majority in Amgen has the better of 
the Rule 23 interpretive arguments—after all, the fraud-on-the-market theory 
matters to predominance only instrumentally, and the text of Rule 23(b)(3) 
does not prohibit the majority’s interpretation—the 23(b)(3) question was no 
slam dunk. A Court motivated to restrict the class action could have crafted 
an argument for requiring proof of materiality under Rule 23(b)(3) itself, as 
well as under Basic and Dukes. Amgen is puzzling not only given its tension 
with prior precedent, but also because it departed from the Roberts Court’s 
trend toward resolving close calls against the class action. 
The Court issued another confounding pro–class action opinion in 
Halliburton II. There, the Court first rejected defendants’ argument to 
overrule Basic.37 The Court then rejected defendants’ contention that 
plaintiffs must directly prove “price impact” in order to invoke the Basic 
presumption at certification.38 It also held that defendants’ individualized 
right to rebut the presumption of reliance did not defeat predominance under 
Rule 23(b)(3).39 In so doing, the Court dismissed various policy arguments 
 
34 See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1723 
(2012) (noting that, as “trials have all but disappeared, settlement . . . has become the dominant 
mode of civil dispute resolution”); Nagareda, supra note 19, at 172 (observing that “settlement, rather 
than trial, [is] the endgame of civil litigation”). 
35 485 U.S. 224, 230, 248 n.27 (1988) (granting certiorari to determine “whether the courts below 
properly applied a presumption of reliance in certifying the class,” and noting that, “in order to invoke 
the fraud on the market presumption, a plaintiff must allege and prove . . . that the misrepresentations 
were material”). 
36 Congress has done nothing to overturn Basic, which listed materiality as a prerequisite for 
invoking the fraud-on-the-market theory. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking 
Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 153 (“Though urged to do so by politicians and lobbyists 
pushing an aggressive reform package, Congress did not undo Basic’s presumption, and so the 
holding lives on today.”). But see Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1204 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
support for the fraud-on-the-market theory “is to be found nowhere in the United States Code” but 
instead “was invented by the Court in Basic”). 
37 Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (noting that, “[b]efore overturning a long-settled 
precedent” the Court “require[s] ‘special justification,’” concluding that “Halliburton has failed to 
make that showing” (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000))). 
38 Id. at 2414. 
39 Id. at 2412. 
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against class actions themselves.40 Indeed, the Court fully preserved Basic, 
not in spite of the class-facilitative effects of the fraud-on-the-market theory, 
but because of them. 
As with Amgen, the result in Halliburton II is not easily explained. 
Juxtapose, for example, the Court’s treatment in Halliburton II of defendants’ 
right to rebut the presumption of reliance under 10b-5 with its Rule 23 
analysis of defendants’ right to rebut a presumption of discrimination under 
Title VII in Dukes.41 Under Title VII, defendants have a right to rebut 
evidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination with individualized proof 
that, for any individual employee, any such pattern or practice did not affect 
employment decisions.42 Plaintiffs’ proposed “Trial by Formula” for 
answering questions of liability and backpay through common proof would 
violate the Enabling Act by abridging defendants’ substantive right to 
individualized rebuttals.43 
Similarly, Basic states that defendants have a right to rebut reliance for 
each and every class member.44 After Dukes, it would seem that such a right 
necessarily defeats predominance under Rule 23(b)(3). But despite the result 
in Dukes, where the defendants’ right precluded certification of a proposed 
(b)(2) class in part because that right defeated commonality, the Court in 
Halliburton II brushed a conceptually similar right aside. Indeed, the majority 
in Halliburton II characterized defendants’ right as simply one to “pick off” a 
few class members here or there.45 And a right of that nature would not 
generate so significant a number of individualized issues as to defeat 
predominance (much less commonality). That analysis may well have been 
necessary to preserve Basic, but it is inconsistent with Dukes, which views the 
 
40 Id. at 2413 (noting that concerns over class actions’ potentially negative policy consequences 
“are more appropriately addressed to Congress”). 
41 Compare id. at 2412 (“That the defendant might attempt to pick off the occasional class 
member here or there through individualized rebuttal does not cause individual questions to 
predominate.”), with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (holding that “a class 
cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses 
to individual claims”). 
42 See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (holding that after the 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, “[t]he burden that shifts 
to the defendant . . . is to rebut the presumption of discrimination . . . that the plaintiff was rejected, 
or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason”); see also id. at 254 n.8 
(“This evidentiary relationship between the presumption created by a prima facie case and the 
consequential burden of production placed on the defendant is a traditional feature of the common 
law. ‘The word “presumption” properly used refers only to a device for allocating the production 
burden.’” (quoting JAMES FLEMING JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 7–9 (2d ed. 1977))). 
43 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 367. 
44 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 (1987); see also Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2424 n.6 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (describing Basic as “offer[ing] defendants a chance to rebut the presumption 
on individualized grounds”). 
45 Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2412. 
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defendants’ right formally and the question as what is the appropriate scope 
of Rule 23 under the Enabling Act.46 
The securities fraud “pro–class action” trilogy is also out of step with the 
Court’s view of the class action, given the Court’s contemporaneous decisions 
cutting back at class certification and the class action device itself. First, in 
Comcast, the Court ratcheted up certification requirements by holding that to 
satisfy predominance under Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs must show, through 
“evidentiary proof,” that they can “establish that damages are susceptible of 
measurement across the entire class.”47 This is a potentially remarkable swipe 
at class actions: a requirement that damages must be measurable “on a classwide 
basis”48 flies in the face of longstanding recognition that individual damages 
calculations do not defeat predominance.49  
At roughly the same time, the Court cut back sharply on the class action 
device itself in a series of cases involving arbitration contracts that prohibited 
class actions. Lower courts had split on the permissibility of these so-called “class 
action waivers.”50 The Roberts Court, recounting stock anti–class action 
arguments—particularly that class actions generate in terrorem settlement 
pressure—resolved the division firmly in favor of the class action prohibitions.51 
 
46 Halliburton did achieve one small victory: the Court held that securities-fraud defendants 
could use price impact evidence to rebut plaintiffs’ invocation of the fraud-on-the-market theory, 
leading some securities scholars to characterize Halliburton II as class action restrictive. See, e.g., John 
C. Coates IV, Securities Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 14 
(2015) (commenting that, in the wake of Halliburton II, defendants “will have an additional ability 
to block class certification by showing that the alleged misrepresentations had no impact on the price 
of the stock at the time the misrepresentations were made”); Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day 
for Fraud-on-the-Market: Reflections on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 
37, 47 (2015) (noting that Halliburton II permits defendants to raise the issue of price impact as a 
defense to certification). However, the impact on securities class actions is likely to be slight. See 
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n practice, the so-called ‘rebuttable 
presumption’ is largely irrebuttable.”). 
47 Comcast Corp. v. Behrand, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432-33 (2013). 
48 Id. at 1433 (“[U]nder the proper standard for evaluating certification, respondents’ model 
falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis.”). 
49 Id. at 1437 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“Recognition that individual damages 
calculations do not preclude class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well nigh universal.”). 
50 See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 1, at 402-04 (identifying a lower court split on the interpretation of class 
action waivers in contracts); J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory 
Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1752-54 (2006) (describing the majority and minority 
approaches to determining the validity of class action waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements). 
51 The Court in Stolt-Nielsen declined to infer an “implicit agreement to authorize class-action 
arbitration,” largely due to various policy concerns with the class action device. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685-86 (2010). Against that backdrop, the Court held in 
Concepcion that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted a California unconscionability rule calling 
for courts to strike down class action bans when they amounted to exculpatory clauses. AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). In Italian Colors, presented with a factual 
record demonstrating that it would be uneconomical for claimants to assert their antitrust claims 
individually, the Court held that the FAA required the terms of arbitration contracts to be 
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Thus, in the context of the Roberts Court’s class action opinions—indeed, in 
the context of the Roberts Court’s so-called “procedural revolution” in favor of 
business52—the securities fraud trilogy is an oddity. As of 2015, any “pro–class 
action” stance in the Court was largely viewed as securities-fraud specific. But then 
the Court issued its latest, and perhaps largest, victory for class actions: Tyson 
Foods v. Bouaphakeo.53 
Tyson is not only at odds with the holdings in Dukes and Comcast and the 
broad language condemning class actions in the class arbitration cases, but it 
is also in tension with the view that the Court limits its pro–class action 
opinions to the securities fraud context. Tyson involved a class of employees 
of Tyson Foods who, following a jury trial, had recovered $2.9 million in 
compensatory damages arising from Tyson’s violations of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 193854 (FLSA) and, by incorporation of the FLSA, the Iowa 
Wage Payment Collection Law55 (IWPCL).56 The crux of plaintiffs’ claims 
was that Tyson had not paid statutorily mandated overtime for time 
employees spent donning and doffing protective equipment—time that Tyson 
had not recorded, as required by statute.57 Because Tyson failed to record 
employee time, plaintiffs relied on a statistical time study to establish liability 
and damages through common proof.58 
On appeal, Tyson argued that plaintiffs’ reliance on this time study was 
improper. First, Tyson asserted that time spent donning and doffing raised 
individualized questions of fact under Rule 23(b)(3), particularly as to 
uninjured plaintiffs who had not worked more than forty hours per week.59 
Second, Tyson contended that plaintiffs’ time-study, offered as common proof 
under Rule 23 of liability and damages, violated its right under the FLSA to 
present individualized defenses.60 Third, Tyson argued that since plaintiffs’ 
 
“rigorously enforce[d],” regardless of the consequences to dispute resolution or claiming. Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); see J. Maria Glover, Disappearing 
Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3072-74 (2015) (describing Italian 
Colors’s eliminating effect on the “effective vindication” principle). 
52 See Coates, supra note 46, at 3; see also Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to 
Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Stephen B. 
Burbank) (describing the Roberts Court’s approach as leading to “the emasculation of private civil 
litigation as a means of enforcing public law”); Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the 
Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 328-29 (2012) (noting the successes of corporate parties 
in several of the major civil procedure decisions of the Roberts Court). 
53 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). 
54 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
55 IOWA CODE §§ 91A.1–14 (2016). 
56 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1042–44. 
57 Id. at 1042. 
58 Id. at 1043. 
59 Id. at 1044. 
60 Id. at 1048. 
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model could not sort out members of the plaintiff class who were uninjured, 
damages could not be calculated on a class-wide basis under 23(b)(3), as 
required by Comcast.61 
The fact that Tyson appealed a mere $2.9 million judgment to the Supreme 
Court is noteworthy: it was no doubt a broad attempt by Tyson and members of 
the class action defense bar to capitalize on the anti–class action and anti–statistical 
evidence sentiment in the Roberts Court.62 The gambit: to cut back significantly 
on class actions by eliminating the use of statistical evidence at certification. 
Instead, the Court handed Tyson a sweeping defeat. 
Like Halliburton II and Amgen before it, Tyson is difficult to reconcile with 
the Court’s broader class action jurisprudence. In Tyson, the majority 
approved plaintiffs’ use of statistical proof for liability and damages, with nary 
a whisper of its earlier disapproval in Dukes of that same approach. Instead, 
somewhat turning Dukes on its head, the Court held that prohibiting statistical 
sampling in class cases would violate the Enabling Act.63 The Court also 
found—with no mention of Comcast—that any individualized liability or 
damages issues as they related to uninjured plaintiffs could be addressed prior 
to allocation of the class-wide judgment.64 
Some have attempted to contextualize Tyson as a quirky FLSA case,65 or 
even as a quirky Tyson case66—driven by the particular foibles of Tyson itself. 
Such theories seem more predictive than descriptive. Long before 
mentioning the FLSA, the Court spent over a page emphasizing the 
 
61 Id. at 1049-50; see also Reply Brief of Petitioner at 14, Tyson, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (No. 14-1146) 
(“Comcast’s reasoning controls here. Once Tyson showed that the Mericle time study [failed to 
prove] that any class members worked unpaid overtime . . . the class should have been decertified.”). 
62 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 
(2011) (opining that class action plaintiffs suffered losses before the Court that could have been 
avoided but for their “overreach”). 
63 Compare Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1046 (holding that representative evidence may not be deemed 
improper merely because it is offered in support of a class action plaintiff ’s claim, since doing so 
“would ignore the Rules Enabling Act’s pellucid instruction that use of the class device cannot 
abridge any substantive right” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 
U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (holding that, since the Enabling Act forbids abridging any substantive right, 
“a class cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory 
defenses to individual claims”). 
64 Compare Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1050 (“Petitioner may raise a challenge to the proposed method of 
allocation when the case returns to the District Court for disbursal of the award.”), with Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (reversing the decision of the Third Circuit for “refusing to entertain 
arguments against respondents’ damages model that bore on the propriety of class certification”). On 
remand, the district court determined that there were no uninjured plaintiffs. Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, 
Inc., No. 5:07-cv-04009-JAJ, 2016 WL 5868081, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 6, 2016). 
65 See, e.g., Andrew J. Trask, Litigation Matters: The Curious Case of Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, 
2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 279, 279 (15th ed. 2016) (suggesting that in Tyson, “the Court was not 
engaging in a particular project to expand or limit its previous holdings, but instead deciding the 
case on the unique facts in front of it”). 
66 Trask, supra note 65. 
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importance of statistical evidence to a wide range of substantive laws and to 
class actions generally.67 Tyson cannot be read to simply permit statistical 
proof in a narrow set of circumstances. Further, the Court mentions Tyson’s 
missteps—particularly its opposition to bifurcation at the trial stage—as an 
afterthought.68 Something else must be afoot. 
 
*      *      * 
The Supreme Court’s dueling sets of class action cases cannot be fully 
reconciled by a straightforward application of Rule 23 or prior precedent. Nor 
can they be easily distinguished by the particular facts of those cases. While 
one or more of these interpretive methods are relevant to understanding the 
class action decisions, they do not sufficiently explain them. Accordingly, 
these cases cannot be accurately described as “pro–” or “anti–” class action, 
either in the abstract or relative to one another. The following part uncovers 
an alternative lens through which these cases may be viewed more clearly. 
II. THE COURT’S “NON-TRANSSUBSTANTIVE” CLASS ACTION 
DECISIONS 
A procedural view of the Supreme Court’s recent class action decisions 
yields perplexing inconsistency. This Part suggests that to make sense of these 
cases, one must look beyond the “procedural” veneer and view the cases not 
only as decisions about Rule 23 and class actions, but, just as importantly, as 
decisions about whether the law should embrace substantive rules that 
facilitate class actions. 
The term “substantive” eludes easy definition.69 The rules and decisions to 
which this Article refers as “substantive” include interstitial lawmaking vis-à-vis 
the contours and interpretation of underlying liability policy, rights of redress 
and rebuttal, and federal statutes. Moreover, these judgments are informed 
by the desirability (or lack thereof) of their class-facilitative effects within the 
context of various substantive remedial schemes. And it is these substantive 
decisions that often drive the procedural outcomes in the class action cases. 
Thus, while largely viewed as procedural cases—and indeed, largely ignored 
by the media and the public as such70—these class action cases, both under 
 
67 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1045-47. 
68 Id. at 1050 (relegating the consideration of Tyson’s litigation conduct to the final four 
sentences of the majority opinion). 
69 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974) 
(remarking that the terms “substance” and “procedure” lack any “monolithic meaning”). 
70 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, The Subterranean Counterrevolution: The Supreme 
Court, the Media, and Litigation Retrenchment, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 293, 319 (2015) (demonstrating 
that “Supreme Court rulings on private enforcement of rights receive dramatically less press 
coverage than decisions concerning the rights themselves”). 
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Rule 23 (infra Section II.A.) and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)71 (infra 
Section II.B.), seem decidedly non-“trans-substantive.”72 
A. The Court’s “Non-Transsubstantive” Rule 23 Jurisprudence 
A closer look at the Court’s Rule 23 decisions reveals that, though largely 
framed as procedural, they are driven in large part by the Court’s substantive 
judgments. Specifically, subsection 1 examines the (largely implicit) 
substantive lawmaking driving these “procedural” holdings. Subsection 2 
explores the Court’s composite judgments about the interaction between the 
class action and the overall substantive remedial regime—judgments that 
ultimately inform the Court’s willingness to adopt any particular class-facilitative 
substantive rule. Both sorts of judgments suggest a “non-transsubstantive” 
character to the Roberts Court’s class action jurisprudence, and that character 
in turn alleviates procedural whiplash. 
1. Substantive Lawmaking 
A deeper analysis of the Roberts Court’s Rule 23 cases reveals that its 
holdings often derive from the Court’s lawmaking vis-à-vis the relevant 
substantive liability rules. Indeed, Rule 23 often—appropriately—takes its 
procedural marching orders from the dictates of the underlying substantive 
law. The Rule 23 cases are not so much at odds with one another as a matter 
of procedure—rather, they are perhaps not predominantly about procedure.  
Reconsider, then, the securities class action opinions. Even with the clear 
interrelationship between the substantive evidentiary presumption from Basic 
and Rule 23, the parties’ briefs—even in Halliburton II—framed the questions 
presented around the class action consequences of Basic, as did amicus briefs 
on both sides and scholarly commentary before and after the decision.73 
Defendants’ ultimate gambit was not so much substantive—to destroy the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption—but instead procedural—to destroy 
 
71 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08, 301-07 (2006). 
72 Marcus, supra note 11, at 1203-07 (describing transsubstantivity as existing on a spectrum in 
the context of procedural doctrine). 
73 See e.g., Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2-3, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (describing 
“the significant burden imposed on their members by private securities class action litigation, which 
adversely affects access to capital markets and raises costs for American businesses of all sizes”); 
Brief of Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae With Respect to Stare Decisis in Support of Respondent 
at 18, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (No. 13-317) (arguing that “[o]verruling Basic would pull the rug 
out from under Congress’s feet”); Eric Alan Isaacson, The Roberts Court and Securities Class Actions: 
Reaffirming Basic Principles, 48 AKRON L. REV. 923, 948-49 (2015) (suggesting that Halliburton II’s 
“far-reaching consequences for securities-fraud litigation . . . . are apt, on whole, to be quite 
favorable to class-action plaintiffs asserting fraud-on-the-market claims”). 
1638 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1625 
securities class actions which typically cannot survive certification without 
that presumption. 
Defendants’ procedural gambit was met with defeat, but the defeat was 
not particularly “procedural.” Though framed as Rule 23(b)(3) holdings, 
neither the materiality determination in Amgen nor the rebuttal right 
characterization in Halliburton II flowed from Basic.74 Nor did they require 
rejection, narrowing, or distinction from the Rule 23 holdings in Dukes. 
Nonetheless, the Rule 23 holdings in Amgen and Halliburton II require 
something—something beyond Rule 23, Basic, and Dukes—that bridges the 
gap between individual and class proceedings. That something is the Court’s 
substantive, interstitial lawmaking regarding the meaning of Basic and, to 
some degree, Rule 10b-5. 
Start with Amgen. The majority in Amgen could not reach its conclusion that 
materiality need not be proved at certification without tip-toeing around Basic: 
in the view of the Amgen majority, Basic requires materiality as a prerequisite for 
invoking the fraud-on-the-market presumption, but it does not require proof of 
materiality for purposes of certification.75 The majority in Amgen also could not 
reach its conclusion without tip-toeing around Dukes, which requires courts to 
perform a “rigorous analysis” of questions bearing upon class certification 
requirements—including those that overlap with the merits.76 
Consider Halliburton II. The Court’s individual rebuttal rights holding from 
Dukes could have dictated a contrary Rule 23(b)(3) result—unless, of course, 
the Court in both cases in fact engaged in implicit lawmaking vis-à-vis the 
nature and scope of the respective rebuttal rights under 10b-5 and Title VII. 
The exercise of this interstitial lawmaking power in both cases provides the 
Court freedom—as a matter of Rule 23 precedent, and, to the extent Basic 
enjoys congressional support, the separation-of-powers values underlying the 
Enabling Act77—to render its functionalist Rule 23(b)(3) holdings. In fact, 
 
74 See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230, 248 n.27 (granting certiorari to determine “whether 
the courts below properly applied a presumption of reliance in certifying the class,” and noting that, 
“in order to invoke the presumption, a plaintiff must allege and prove . . . that the misrepresentations 
were material”); see also id. at 250 (“That presumption, however, is rebuttable.”). Furthermore, the 
Court in Basic did not mention the Rules Enabling Act as it did in Dukes. See Basic, 485 U.S. 224; Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (“Because the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting 
Rule 23 to ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’ a class cannot be certified on the 
premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.”). 
75 See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1188, 1195 (2013) (noting that, 
under Basic, materiality is “indisputably” an “essential predicate of the fraud-on-the-market theory” 
but holding that proof of materiality is not needed at the certification stage to satisfy the 
requirement of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3)). 
76 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351. 
77 See supra note 36. If Basic does have congressional imprimatur, the Court is constrained by the 
separation of powers in procedural decisionmaking. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act 
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once those substantive judgments were rendered, contrary Rule 23 holdings 
that might have better aligned with Dukes were largely foreclosed. The 
procedural holdings in the securities fraud cases flowed, as they must, from 
the dictates of the substantive law. 
As it turns out, so did the procedural holdings in Dukes. Recall that in 
Dukes, the principal question presented was whether this extraordinarily large 
class satisfied the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a). That question, 
however, obscures an embedded question of substantive liability policy in 
Title VII. Because Wal-Mart had no official company-wide policy of gender 
discrimination, plaintiffs argued instead that Wal-Mart’s discrimination 
emanated from the national level, after which regional managers became 
conduits for discrimination by exercising discretion over pay and promotion 
decisions on “excessively subjective” terms.78 
The Ninth Circuit certified the class on the grounds that plaintiffs had 
raised a common question under Rule 23(a) as to whether such a 
discriminatory policy, under their conduit theory, existed.79 But therein lies 
the rub. Without answering the antecedent question—is the conduit theory 
a viable method of creating a presumption of discrimination under Title 
VII—one cannot know whether there is a common question under Rule 23(a). 
Again, the common question cannot be whether there is a common question. 
The foregoing analysis of the securities fraud cases reveals why that 
procedural Rule 23 problem—which securities fraud defendants attempted to 
create for plaintiffs by reintroducing to securities fraud certification the 
antecedent question of reliance under Rule 10b-580—was ameliorated by the 
Court’s substantive interpretations of Basic. Just as with the fraud-on-the-market 
theory, the Dukes plaintiffs’ proposed “conduit” theory of discrimination, if 
accepted, could “bridge the gap” between individual suits and a nationwide 
class suit.81 Unlike its decisions in the securities fraud context, however, the 
Court in Dukes was unwilling to provide the Title VII bridge the plaintiffs 
there needed. 
Despite the host of procedural language, any “bridge” between individual 
and class suits in Dukes could not have come from Rule 23.82 Fundamentally, 
 
of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1106-07 (1982) (exploring the historical role separation-of-powers 
concerns played in explaining Congress’s grant of rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court). 
78 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 613 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
79 Id. at 596. 
80 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
81 Dukes, 603 F.3d at 632 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
82 If Title VII does not permit recovery under a conduit theory of liability, Rule 23 cannot be 
used to render unlawful conduct that has not been deemed so by an appropriate lawmaking body. 
See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1137, 1189-98 (2012) (discussing the impermissibility of remedial expansion through 
procedure); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 
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the gap exists within the substantive liability policy of Title VII. And the 
logic, not the language, of Dukes is revealing on this score: the Court’s newly 
articulated Rule 23(a) standard is not what sunk the plaintiffs.83 If plaintiffs’ 
conduit theory of liability were valid as a matter of substantive Title VII 
liability policy, whether plaintiffs had satisfied the new commonality standard 
would have simply required an evaluation of whether the class had presented 
sufficient evidence, at the certification stage, to support that theory. Instead, 
plaintiffs could not satisfy the commonality requirement in Dukes because the 
Court—without nearly the level of substantive discussion present in 
Halliburton II or even Amgen—refused to interpret Title VII as encompassing 
plaintiffs’ conduit theory.84 Once the substantive choice was made, the 
procedural consequences under the new Rule 23(a) standard flowed naturally. 
The same holds true for the Court’s determination in Dukes that plaintiffs’ 
proposed use of trial-by-formula to satisfy Rule 23 requirements would violate 
the Enabling Act. As Tobias Wolff has argued, that “procedural” holding 
flowed from the Court’s (largely implicit) interstitial interpretation of 
defendants’ substantive rebuttal right under Section 706 of Title VII as 
requiring individualized proceedings.85 Halliburton II reinforces Wolff ’s 
argument: instead of conflicting (impermissibly) as a transsubstantive matter, 
the holdings in Dukes and Halliburton II vis-à-vis the Rule 23 consequences of 
defendants’ individual rebuttal rights under Title VII and 10b-5, respectively, 
diverge based on the dictates of entirely different substantive rules. 
The “non-transsubstantive” nature of Dukes is likewise reinforced by the 
“non-transsubstantive” nature of Tyson. If either the holding in Tyson—that 
prohibitions on statistical evidence in class cases run afoul of the Enabling 
Act—or the statement in Dukes—that rejects the use of statistical evidence to 
overcome Rule 23 hurdles—is transsubstantive, a bit of a Voldemort problem 
exists: “[N]either can live while the other survives.”86 Yet central to the debate 
in Tyson was, whether under the so-called Mt. Clemens rule, an individual 
plaintiff can use representative evidence to establish through common proof 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 149, 223 (2003) (arguing that the rights of class members are the rights of “would-be 
class members absent the class”). 
83 See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 18, at 1036 (“Questions of Rule 23 policy . . . must be coupled with 
questions of liability policy—what type of showing will establish liability in a Title VII disparate 
impact case, and what type of evidence is competent to make that showing?”). 
84 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352 (2011) (pointing out that the plaintiffs’ 
theory of discrimination could never answer the question of “why was I disfavored”). 
85 Wolff, supra note 18, at 1046-47 (noting that “[s]ection 706(g)’s references to . . . an affirmative 
defense if adverse action toward ‘such individual’ was non-discriminatory might require individual 
hearings and foreclose a (b)(2) class action”). 
86 J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX 841 (2003). 
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damages and, quite controversially, liability under the FLSA.87 Inside that 
certification question is an embedded substantive law question about 
permissible forms of proof of liability under the FLSA. 
Although the majority (unsurprisingly) expresses its holding in Tyson in 
the procedural language of Rule 23, its decision turns on the resolution of that 
embedded substantive law question. Providing only a cursory explanation, 
the majority described Mt. Clemens as making “representative” evidence a 
“permissible means” to show “individual injury”—without even addressing 
the language in Mt. Clemens itself that limited the rule to proof of individual 
damages.88 Indeed, Justice Thomas addressed this squarely in dissent: Mt. 
Clemens expressly limited the use of such evidence to circumstances where 
liability had already been established, and the only outstanding issue was 
estimating damages.89 The permissibility of statistical evidence to prove 
individual FLSA injury is thus a creation of Tyson itself. And Tyson’s Enabling 
Act holding follows directly from this substantive interpretation of Mt. 
Clemens and the FLSA. As in Dukes, there is no real Rule 23 issue. 
Indeed, one of the only real Rule 23 issues in the Court’s Rule 23 cases 
appears in Comcast. And that “real” (meaning purely transsubstantive) Rule 
23 issue exists less because of an absence of an embedded substantive law 
question, and more because of the majority’s explicit refusal to engage it.90 
The transsubstantive Rule 23(b)(3) predominance holding in Comcast 
purported to rest on the self-evident proposition that a damages model which 
does not “fit” with the substantive theory of liability at the time of 
certification can never be sufficient proof of damages as a matter of law.91 The 
majority explicitly disavows consideration of the interaction between Rule 23 
and the underlying substantive law, even though the question of whether 
plaintiffs’ damages model (which calculated y) can also calculate x is less a 
 
87 See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 (2016) (holding that “the 
representative evidence here was a permissible means of making” the substantive showings necessary 
to establish liability and that reliance on the representative evidence “did not deprive petitioner of 
its ability to litigate individual defenses” (citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 
680, 685-88 (1946)). 
88 See Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 688 (“But here we are assuming that the employee has proved 
that he has performed work and has not been paid in accordance with the statute. The damage is 
therefore certain. The uncertainty lies only in the amount of damages arising from the statutory 
violation by the employer.”). 
89 Tyson, 136 U.S. at 1058 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “Mt. Clemens does not hold that 
employees can use representative evidence in FLSA cases to prove an otherwise uncertain element 
of liability”). 
90 See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (“This case thus turns on the 
straightforward application of class-certification principles; it provides no occasion for the dissent’s 
extended discussion of substantive antitrust law.” (citations omitted)). 
91 See id. at 1433-34 (finding “no question that the model failed to measure damages resulting 
from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners’ liability in this action is premised”). 
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question of predominance and more a question of substantive antitrust law, 
as Justices Ginsburg and Breyer argue in dissent.92 
On its face, then, Comcast would seem to preclude the predominance 
holding in Tyson—that individualized damages need not be determined with 
such precision at the certification stage. Tyson was not obviously free to depart 
from Comcast’s Rule 23 holding without distinguishing it, or (depending on 
Comcast’s precedential value), overruling it.93 The Court in Tyson did neither. 
To be sure, there is a reasonable transsubstantive distinction between the 
predominance problems in Tyson and Comcast. In Comcast, the Rule 23(b)(3) 
problem could be described as plaintiffs’ inability to prove damages in a 
common way, because individualized damages calculations could not be 
derived from their proffered damages theory.94 In Tyson, there arguably was 
no such problem, since plaintiffs’ damages model did adequately calculate 
individualized damages using common statistical evidence. 95 
However, that transsubstantive distinction obscures the fact that, in both 
Comcast and Tyson, the Rule 23(b)(3) problem is conceptually the same: 
substantive law allows plaintiffs to recover x; plaintiffs’ damages model is 
common, but it actually calculates y. In Comcast, substantive antitrust law 
entitled plaintiffs to recover damages flowing from an overbuilder theory of 
liability—x; but plaintiffs’ damages model was based on four theories of 
antitrust liability—y.96 In Tyson, plaintiffs were entitled under the FLSA to 
recover pay for overtime hours—x; but plaintiffs’ damages theory calculated 
 
92 See id. at 1437-41 (discussing the damages model in the context of substantive antitrust law). 
93 Some—including the dissenting Justices in Comcast—have argued that Comcast was merely 
a “case for the day,” particularly given the Comcast parties’ stipulation that antitrust damages under 
Rule 23 need be provable through common evidence. Id. at 1437 (“The Court’s ruling is good for 
this day and case only.”). History may well characterize Comcast as such. However, while the 
stipulation was no doubt relevant to the majority’s analysis, assertions that Comcast was a “case for 
the day” tend to obscure and ultimately revise its historical context. The relevant Justices went to 
great lengths not only to hear Comcast, but also to effectuate revision of the question presented from 
one about admissibility of expert data to one subjecting that expert data to a predominance analysis. 
In their petition for a writ of certiorari, petitioners originally presented the court with the question 
of “whether a district court may certify a class action without resolving ‘merits arguments’ that bear 
on Rule 23’s prerequisites for certification, including whether purportedly common issues 
predominate over individual ones under Rule 23(b)(2).” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 
i, Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (No. 11-864). However, the Justices intervened and requested the 
advocates instead argue “[w]hether a district court may certify a class action without resolving 
whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that 
the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.” See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435. 
Such effort seems unlikely had those Justices simply wished to validate a party stipulation. 
94 133 S. Ct. at 1433 (noting that “respondents’ model falls far short of establishing that 
damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis”). 
95 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1051 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(supporting the majority’s conclusion that “respondents could adequately prove the amount of time 
for each individual through generalized, class-wide proof”). 
96 133 S. Ct. at 1433-34. 
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the average time worked by a sample of plaintiffs, some of whom may not 
have worked overtime—y.97 
A purely transsubstantive lens misses this conceptual similarity and the 
tension it reveals in the jurisprudence. Tyson and Comcast provide very 
different answers under Rule 23(b)(3)—not because the predominance issues 
are conceptually different, but in spite of the fact that they are conceptually 
the same. Why? 
The answer here begins on familiar terrain, with “non-transsubstantivity.” 
Specifically, the majority’s predominance analysis in Tyson necessarily rests 
upon interpreting the FLSA as not requiring a perfect “fit” between a damages 
model and the underlying theory of FLSA liability, at least for certification 
purposes.98 In Tyson, y is an acceptable approximation of x under the FLSA, 
and a common model that calculates y thus satisfies the Rule 23 predominance 
standard. The procedural consequences flow from the interstitial lawmaking 
vis-à-vis the FLSA, not from any procedural holding in Comcast. 
Indeed, the rigidly transsubstantive nature of the holding in Comcast 
further reconciles the predominance holdings. The Comcast analysis is pitched 
so formalistically that the resulting procedural holding exists almost 
abstractly. Indeed, the analyses in Tyson and Comcast operate at completely 
different levels—the latter disavows substantive law altogether.99 That 
disavowal is no trifling matter. Given the Comcast majority’s unwillingness to 
consider the effect substantive antitrust law might have on its Rule 23 analysis, 
it almost certainly did not consider other substantive statutes—like the 
FLSA—that might be “abridge[d], modif[ied], or enlarge[d]” by its explicitly 
transsubstantive procedural holding.100 That does not necessarily mean Tyson 
implicitly overruled Comcast—it simply makes clear that the transsubstantive 
Comcast holding, like any transsubstantive holding, must yield when 
substantive rules would dictate a contrary result. 
 
*      *      * 
The foregoing discussion reveals that the divergent Rule 23 holdings in 
the Roberts Court’s class action jurisprudence derive not so much from 
impermissibly divergent transsubstantive interpretations of Rule 23, but 
rather from permissible judgments about underlying substantive law and 
rules. Thus, the “non-transsubstantive” character of these cases is largely 
 
97 136 S. Ct. at 1043. 
98 Id. at 1047 (observing that “the ‘remedial nature of [the FLSA] and the great public policy 
which it embodies . . . militate against making’ the burden of proving uncompensated work ‘an 
impossible hurdle for the employee’” (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens 
Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946))). 
99 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
100 See infra Section III.A. 
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sufficient to resolve the tension between them as a matter of Rule 23 
interpretation. However, because the Court could have come out differently on 
all of its class-facilitative substantive judgments, the “non-transsubstantive” 
nature of these cases is not wholly sufficient to resolve the tension among these 
cases as a matter of class action policy—a puzzle explored in the next subsection. 
2. Composite Judgments: Substantive Policy and Procedural Consequences 
While substantive lawmaking in the class action cases can explain the 
divergent Rule 23 results, the same cannot be said for the divergent class 
action consequences. A court with a monolithic antipathy for the class action 
could have come to contrary results in all of the pro–class action cases. But 
the Roberts Court did not. The question is: why? 
One possible answer is that, although the language of Basic, the FLSA, 
and Mt. Clemens was insufficient to dictate any pro–class action holding, that 
language does not exist in an interpretive vacuum. Rather, it exists alongside 
interpretive principles such as stare decisis and congressional deference. A 
combination of those principles ultimately dictated the adoption of class-facilitative 
substantive rules. But that answer can only explain so much. 
There is no doubt that the holdings in Amgen and Halliburton II reflect 
adherence to stare decisis principles. But this begs more questions than it 
answers. While the Court pays special heed to stare decisis in the context of 
statutory interpretation,101 Basic is no such case. And both Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Kennedy have exhibited a willingness to depart from stare 
decisis.102 So why do they adhere to it so rigidly following Basic when doing 
so facilitates class actions? 
Of course, the language in Amgen and Halliburton II suggests that adherence 
to stare decisis was commended, if not commanded, by separation-of-powers 
principles, given Congress’s refusal to set aside Basic when it enacted the 
otherwise class-restrictive Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) 
and Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA).103 But there is 
 
101 See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (noting that 
stare decisis has “special force” in the context of statutory interpretation). 
102 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 900 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.) (“Stare decisis, we conclude, does not compel our continued 
adherence . . . .”). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy have also departed from stare decisis 
in constitutional cases. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for ignoring stare decisis and rejecting stare decisis “with nary 
an explanation” for why it does so). 
103 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 16, 112 Stat. 
3227, 3227–33 (limiting shareholders’ ability to bring securities class actions); Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, § 27(a)(1), 109 Stat. 737, 737 (applying the provisions 
of the law to “each private action . . . that is brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure”). 
2017] The Supreme Court's “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action 1645 
more to this puzzle. As Justices Scalia and Thomas have argued, it is not 
obvious as an initial matter that Basic has received legislative support.104 Even 
if those Justices have the weaker argument, why do Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Kennedy interpret Congress’s silence on Basic—in the midst of an 
overall agenda to restrict securities fraud litigation—as commending 
litigation-facilitative results in Amgen and Halliburton II? This, from two 
Justices who have ignored more explicit legislative statements regarding the 
appropriate interpretation of substantive law in other class action cases. 
For instance, a unanimous Court in Dukes barely mentioned Congress 
when it held that Rule 23(b)(2) was an inappropriate vehicle for plaintiffs’ 
claims for backpay under Title VII.105 That omission is surprising. For 
starters, in the 1991 Amendments to Title VII, Congress expressed a clear 
desire for more private enforcement of Title VII, not less. In the 
Amendments, Congress added compensatory and punitive damages to the 
remedial menu.106 Congress explicitly stated that, in doing so, it did not 
intend to “scuttle any of the statute’s existing remedial or conciliation 
procedures.”107 That distinction—which the Court in Dukes waved off—has 
important implications for Rule 23: Congress was legislating against the 
backdrop of long-standing practice in the district courts and courts of 
appeals108 that treated backpay as an equitable remedy that fit within the 
ambit of Rule 23(b)(2),109 along with the long-accepted notion that a district 
 
104 See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2425 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that Basic 
“has nothing to do with statutory interpretation” and instead “concerned a judge-made evidentiary 
presumption for a judge-made element of the implied 10b-5 private cause of action, itself a judicial 
construct that Congress did not enact” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. 
Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that support for 
Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory “is to be found nowhere in the United States Code”). 
105 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011). 
106 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–74 (1991). 
107 H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 73 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 611 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). See also Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 1977A(a)(1) (stating that a complaining 
party under Title VII “may recover compensatory and punitive damages . . . in addition to [equitable] 
relief ” (emphasis added)); Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987) (noting that repeals 
of statutes by implication “are not favored and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is clear 
and manifest” (citations omitted)). 
108 The Supreme Court has suggested that Congress may be said to have endorsed the uniform 
views of appellate court decisions. See, e.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 299 (1995) 
(indicating the Court’s frequent reliance on congressional “reenact[ment of] statutory language that 
has been given a consistent judicial construction” (alteration in original) (quoting Cent. Bank of 
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994))). 
109 See Edward F. Sherman, Complex Litigation: Plagued by Concerns Over Federalism, Jurisdiction 
and Fairness, 37 AKRON L. REV. 589, 602 (2004) (“Employment discrimination cases were especially 
appropriate for (b)(2) because Congress, in passing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, had 
only authorized recovery of money in the form of ‘back pay,’ which was considered equitable and 
did not entitle the parties to a right to jury trial . . . .”). Indeed, in 1991, Congress legislated against 
a long-standing backdrop of the inclusion of backpay in (b)(2) Title VII class actions. See 7AA 
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court could conduct additional, “Stage II” proceedings to determine the amount 
of backpay recovery due to each class member.110 Just as it did following Basic, 
Congress preserved the procedural landscape with respect to claims for 
backpay brought under Title VII and through Rule 23(b)(2). And this time, 
it did so explicitly.111 
Thus, absent unequivocal command from prior precedent or Congress, 
neither stare decisis principles nor deference to congressional prerogatives 
seem to dictate the Court’s judgments about whether to adopt substantive rules 
that facilitate class actions. Instead, stare decisis and congressional deference 
are invoked selectively, only when they align with the Court’s own independent 
judgments about whether to adopt a class-facilitative substantive rule. The 
divergence in the class action cases alone reveals that these independent 
judgments do not stem from the Court’s views on Rule 23 or the class action 
itself—and at least not for Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy.112 
 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1775 n.34 (3d ed. 2017) 
(listing cases in support of the proposition that backpay claims are appropriately brought under 23(b)(2)); 
see also Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998) (discussing the equitable nature 
of backpay relief and its propriety as a remedy sought under Title VII in (b)(2) class actions). 
110 See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361 (1977) (noting that, in 
order to determine individual relief for victims of discrimination, “a district court must usually 
conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the trial”); Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 
F.2d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 1993) (observing that, once a Title VII class action plaintiff has established 
liability, the district court should determine “what method [it] should utilize to formulate a back pay 
award”); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1172-75 (5th Cir. 1978) (remanding but 
confirming that backpay could be determined during Stage II proceedings of a (b)(2) class). 
111 See Jason P. Pogorelec, Note, Under What Circumstances Did Congress Intend to Award Punitive 
Damages for Victims of Unlawful Intentional Discrimination Under Title VII?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1269, 
1304-1305 (1999) (arguing that the addition of punitive damages to Title VII was not intended to 
change existing Title VII practice). 
112 Though more uniform in their class action jurisprudence than Justices Roberts and 
Kennedy, other Justices do not have completely firm class action views either. For instance, Justice 
Breyer is often in favor of class actions. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1041-
50 (2016) (joining the majority in favor of allowing the use of representative samples for a showing 
of predominance in class certification); Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014) (joining the 
concurrence in favor of providing defendants an opportunity prior to certification to rebut the 
materiality presumption given that this judgment “should impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud 
plaintiffs with tenable claims”); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1190-
1204 (2013) (joining the majority in holding materiality is “not a prerequisite to class certification” 
for a securities fraud action based on a fraud-on-the-market theory”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 357-67 (2011) (dissenting from the holding that FAA preempts a state law 
regarding unconscionability of class arbitration waivers and pointing out the benefits of class 
proceedings where “general agreements that forbid the consolidation of claims can lead small-dollar 
claimants to abandon their claims rather than to litigate”). However, in Italian Colors, Justice Breyer’s 
questions during oral arguments addressing the efficiencies of arbitration suggest he is not always 
as favorable to class actions. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-16, 29, Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133) (discussing the relatively straightforward tasks of 
an arbitrator, without the need of an expert report, in an antitrust action). One sees a similar pattern 
with Justice Ginsburg, who voted in favor of class actions in Tyson, Halliburton II, Dukes, Amgen, 
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Instead, these independent judgments about whether to adopt a 
class-facilitative rule appear to lie in a second layer of “non-transsubstantivity.” 
The first layer of “non-transsubstantivity” explored in Section I.A.—namely, 
the Court’s interstitial substantive lawmaking—keeps procedure and substance 
in relatively separate spheres. The substantive lawmaking dictates the 
procedural results. Deeper analysis, however, reveals that these spheres are not 
so separate. Baked into the substantive lawmaking and ultimate procedural 
results are composite judgments: substantive policy judgments about the 
overall remedial scheme113 and judgments about the interaction of that scheme 
with the class action device. 
Some composite judgments are easier to identify than others. Take the 
Court’s characterization of defendants’ rebuttal right in Halliburton II as one 
to “pick off” a plaintiff here or there.114 That is not lawmaking about the 
contours of a substantive right in the abstract. Instead, it is lawmaking all but 
explicitly informed by procedural consequences, as evidenced by the 
alignment between the description of the substantive right and the strictures 
of Rule 23(b)(3).115 
More broadly, the class-facilitative results in the securities fraud cases seem 
to reflect substantive policy judgments about the nature of the remedial regime 
for securities fraud and its interaction with the class action device. Indeed, the 
remedial landscape for securities fraud litigation is not neutral vis-à-vis the 
Court’s views on class actions. Indeed, it is uniquely responsive to many of its 
class action concerns. Consider the following: First, Congress engineered the 
securities fraud landscape so as to prevent unfettered litigation.116 Second, 
plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions are often institutional investors.117 
Sophisticated claimants add a level of credibility to securities fraud claims in 
 
Concepcion, Comcast, and Italian Colors, but against them in Shady Grove. See Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 458-59 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
As a final example, Justice Scalia frequently voted against class actions, but voted for them in Shady 
Grove. Id. at 416. 
113 These judgments include considerations of the scheme’s prohibited conduct, enforcement 
apparatus, regulatory role, typical parties, scope of coverage, and its burden on lower courts. 
114 134 S. Ct. at 2412. 
115 The majority’s description of the right of rebuttal as one simply of “pick[ing] off” individual 
plaintiffs suggests that, as a functional matter, the defendants could disprove reliance only for a few 
individual plaintiffs. This language in Amgen, which presupposes that there were scant, or non-predominant, 
individualized issues of reliance, aligns directly with the language in Rule 23(b)(3), which states that a 
class may be maintained only if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
116 See, e.g., Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2413 (“Congress has, for example, enacted the [PSLRA], 
which sought to combat perceived abuses in securities litigation . . . .”). 
117 See John C. Coffee, Jr., How Not to Write a Class Action “Reform” Bill, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG 
(Feb. 21, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/02/21/how-not-to-write-a-class-action-reform-
bill/ [https://perma.cc/SEL3-L4HD] (“[T]he Private Securities Litigation Reform Act deemed the 
largest investor to be the optimal (and presumptive) lead plaintiff.”). 
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general, which matters to a Court suspicious of meritless suits.118 Third, the 
presence of institutional investors suggests that the alternative to securities 
fraud class actions may not be zero securities fraud litigation but rather 
multifarious individual suits that would clog federal courts’ dockets and require 
extensive resort to the Multidistrict Litigation process.119 Fourth, the Roberts 
Court’s general ideological commitment to a well-functioning free market 
suggests that even a conservative Court with pro-market proclivities may be 
loath to gut private securities enforcement.120 After all, private litigation helps 
vindicate the free market’s interest in avoiding fraud’s corrosive effects.121 This 
interest may well render small-investor class actions tolerable, and Basic 
necessary, since neither institutional investors nor the SEC are likely to fill 
regulatory gaps.122 
Similar composite judgments underlie Tyson. Tyson’s Enabling Act 
holding clearly reflects more than a judgment about statistical evidence in a 
single substantive context. Rather, the Court first made the substantive policy 
determination that statistical proof will be necessary to the enforcement of 
substantive remedial schemes in general.123 Broadly speaking, remedial 
regimes that require statistical evidence for enforcement might be typified by 
harm that tends to be widespread and similar among individuals; harm that 
must be demonstrated through economic or other complex models; harm that 
is concealed from litigants and the public; or harm that occurs at a market 
level, to list just a few. Tyson, for example, featured relatively uniform harm 
 
118 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (requiring that plaintiffs provide more 
than “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” to survive a motion to dismiss); Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (expressing a desire for plaintiffs to plead facts 
suggesting that theirs are plausible causes of action). 
119 There is already evidence of this phenomenon. See AMIR ROZEN, BRENDAN RUDOLPH & 
CHRISTOPHER HARRIS, OPT-OUT CASES IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 
2012–2014 UPDATE 3 (2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Opt-Out-Cases-
in-Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2012-2014 [https://perma.cc/2XQG-L9Q7] (noting first 
that, as class actions get larger, the number of plaintiffs who opt out and bring their own claims 
increases; and second, that the “most common plaintiffs in opt-out cases are pension funds”). 
120 See LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 8-15 (2014) (describing the trend in the Roberts Court toward deregulation). 
121 See Glover, supra note 82, at 1142 (suggesting that private enforcement plays a role in market 
correction that public enforcement cannot). 
122 See Norman S. Poser, Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against Regulation, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 289, 321 (2009) (noting that “the SEC will never have enough resources to adequately 
protect investors against fraud”). 
123 The majority cited the amicus brief filed by Complex Litigation Professors, which lists 
“antitrust, securities fraud, and employment discrimination litigation” as examples of remedial schemes 
requiring statistical proof. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016) (citing 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Complex Litigation Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 4-5, Tyson, 
136 S. Ct. 1036 (No. 14-1146)). 
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that was concealed from the litigants—indeed, harm for which direct proof 
could not be retrieved.124 
Baked into any determination that a particular remedial scheme requires 
statistical evidence for its regulatory function—as with the FLSA in Tyson—also 
appears to be a consideration of the scheme’s class-facilitative consequences. 
Prohibiting statistical proof in Tyson—despite its class-limiting 
consequences—would have cut at the heart of the Court’s substantive policy 
judgments about the function of the FLSA remedial regime. The majority 
did not make these composite judgments fully explicit, but its more 
generalized language preceding its FLSA conclusion—namely, that 
representative evidence is often “the only practicable means”125 for 
establishing defendants’ liability—connects the dots. The class-facilitative 
conclusion is not just tolerable, but required as a matter of the Court’s 
judgments about the substantive remedial regime. 
Opposite composite judgments—judgments that generate a class-impeding 
result—seem to underlie Dukes. In finding that the plaintiffs had not raised a 
common question under Rule 23(a), the Court spilled a not insignificant 
amount of ink recounting the question’s Rule 23 deficiencies.126 These 
deficiencies reveal little about Rule 23(a) itself, but much about how certain 
Justices believe that Title VII harm actually occurs—in relatively overt, 
individualized ways.127 Given that substantive policy judgment about Title VII, 
none of the class-facilitative substantive rules at issue in Dukes seem especially 
appropriate as a matter of the substantive remedial regime. Indeed, facilitating 
class actions in that context would, if anything, appear ill-advised—class actions 
would promote “meritless” Title VII claims, in terrorem settlement pressure, and 
remedial expansion of Title VII.128 
 
124 See id.  
125 Id. at 1046 (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.493 (4th ed. 2004)). 
126 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352-60 (2011). 
127 Though the Court in Dukes never made such views explicit, the notion that they 
conceptualized Title VII injury as highly individualized is rather apparent from the opinion. See, 
e.g., id. at 350 (“Quite obviously, the mere claim by employees of the same company that they have 
suffered a Title VII injury, or even a disparate-impact Title VII injury, gives no cause to believe that 
all their claims can productively be litigated at once.”); id. at 352 (“Here respondents wish to sue 
about literally millions of employment decisions at once. Without some glue holding the alleged 
reasons for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class 
members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 356-67 
(“As Judge Ikuta observed in her dissent [in the Ninth Circuit below], ‘[i]nformation about 
disparities at the regional and national level does not . . . raise the inference that a company-wide 
policy of discrimination is implemented by discretionary decisions at the store and district level.”); 
id. at 358 (“Respondents’ anecdotal evidence . . . is too weak to raise any inference that all the 
individual, discretionary personnel decisions are discriminatory.”). 
128 See Glover, supra note 82, at 1149-50 (observing that facilitating class actions expands 
remedial options in the employment litigation context). 
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*      *      * 
This second level of “non-transsubstantivity” provides a fuller 
explanation for the divergences in the Rule 23 cases. It is also this second level 
of “non-transsubstantivity” that helps reconcile tensions in class action results 
between the Rule 23 cases and the class arbitration cases. The next section 
extends the transsubstantivity analysis to these cases. 
B. The Court’s “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Arbitration Jurisprudence 
The class arbitration cases have so far gone undiscussed, for two reasons. 
First, unlike in the Rule 23 cases, some of the Court’s substantive lawmaking 
in the class arbitration cases—namely, its interpretation of the FAA—is on 
the surface of the opinions.129 Indeed, the anti–class action results in the class 
arbitration cases purportedly rest upon the Court’s substantive interpretation 
of the FAA that class actions are inconsistent with the “nature” of 
arbitration.130 And the Court has struck down both state doctrine (Concepcion) 
and federal judge-made doctrine (Italian Colors) aimed at regulating unfair 
procedural terms of arbitration contracts on the grounds that they disfavored 
arbitration or otherwise interfered with the “nature” of arbitration under the FAA. 
Second, although this substantive lawmaking vis-à-vis the FAA appears 
on the surface of the class arbitration opinions, the substantive lawmaking in 
the class arbitration cases both fails to explain their anti–class action 
procedural results and fails to reconcile them with the pro–class action 
decisions. For example, the Court states that its holding in Concepcion derives 
from the “nature” of arbitration under the FAA.131 So it seems a rather large 
interpretive step to say that class procedures are so inconsistent with the 
nature of arbitration that the FAA would call, functionally, for no arbitration. 
Indeed, a Court intent on preventing the “disfavor[ing]” of arbitration should 
bristle at an FAA holding, like in Italian Colors, that permits—even 
 
129 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2307 (2013) (interpreting 
the FAA in the context of contractual waiver of class arbitration); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 
133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013) (interpreting section 10(a)(4) of the FAA where the parties’ contract 
provided for class arbitration); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666 
(2010) (interpreting the FAA in the context of arbitration clauses that are “silent” on the issue of 
arbitration). 
130 See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 687 (holding an arbitration agreement that was “silent” on the 
matter of class arbitration insufficient to show that parties had consented to class arbitration 
proceedings, which the Court held were at odds with the “basis of arbitration”); see also AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011) (stating that class arbitration proceedings 
change the nature of arbitration). 
131 See, e.g., Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344-48 (stating that the purpose of arbitration is to 
“facilitate streamlined proceedings,” that its “principal advantage [is] its informality,” and that the 
requirement of class-wide arbitration “interferes with [these] fundamental attributes”). 
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incentivizes—a host of contractual terms whose purpose is to eliminate claims, 
whether pursued in court or in arbitration.132 All the more so since neither the 
text nor the legislative history of the FAA dictated the procedural results in the 
class arbitration cases. If anything, the text of the FAA suggests otherwise.133 
As I have discussed in prior work, the critical, though largely obscured, 
analytical move underpinning the Court’s arbitration decisions is its 
fundamental shift from interpreting the FAA as favoring arbitration contracts 
so as to facilitate efficient dispute resolution to interpreting it as requiring 
unfettered freedom of contract—even if arbitration agreements prevent dispute 
resolution altogether.134 Given the swath of arbitration-restrictive procedural 
provisions now permitted by the Court, the consequences of this analytical shift 
are not just anti–class action or anti-arbitration. They are more than that: they 
are anti-claiming and anti–private enforcement of substantive law. 
Third, and this time like the Rule 23 cases, there were embedded 
substantive law issues—issues arising from the substantive laws giving rise to 
the claims themselves—that could have informed the Court’s FAA 
interpretations as well as the class action consequences those interpretations 
dictated. Yet the Court ignored those deeper questions. The Court’s 
interpretations of the FAA were not informed by the substantive law under 
which claims actually arose—even when that substantive law would have 
supported the Court’s ultimate anti–class arbitration holding. In Italian 
Colors, for instance, plaintiffs’ claims arose under the Sherman Act, yet the 
Court ignored legislative history—which was briefed—indicating that 
Congress had rejected a proposed class action provision.135 
This refusal to engage underlying questions of substantive law 
interpretation derives from the fact that, although the Court’s class arbitration 
decisions are one part substantive FAA interpretation, they are also another 
part procedural formalism. The FAA governs “procedure”136—namely, the 
 
132 Glover, supra note 51, at 3076. 
133 See 9 U.S.C. § 2; Glover, supra note 51, at 3062 n.42 (noting the word “settle” in the FAA 
“suggests that contracts for arbitration are contracts for resolving disputes; the effect of an arbitration 
agreement is thus simply to change the forum in which a dispute is settled or resolved. To the extent 
a contract for arbitration frustrates or inhibits the resolving or settling of a dispute, that contract 
arguably falls outside the scope of FAA.”).  
134 See Glover, supra note 51, at 3065 (observing that the Court’s analytical “shift has meant 
establishing procedural rules that do not streamline arbitration, but, if anything, have made it more 
burdensome and difficult for parties to resolve their claims”). 
135 Brief for Petitioners at 6, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) 
(No. 12-133). 
136 Here, I refer to the distinction between matters governing litigation conduct (“procedure”) 
and matters governing primary conduct (“substance”). See Ely, supra note 69, at 724-26 (identifying 
a procedural rule as one “designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism 
for the resolution of disputes” (footnotes omitted) and contrasting that with rules of substance, or 
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forum for resolving substantive claims. In formalistic analysis reminiscent of 
Comcast, the Court declines to consider any interaction between its 
interpretations of the “procedural” FAA and the substantive statutes giving 
rise to the claims at issue. So what explains the ultimate results here? 
On this score, the first level of “non-transsubstantivity” identified in the 
Rule 23 cases—underlying substantive lawmaking—falls short. It simply fails 
to account for the results in the class arbitration cases. However, that 
distinction between the class arbitration cases and the Rule 23 cases 
nonetheless reveals the “non-transsubstantive” judgments at work deep 
beneath the surface in the class arbitration cases: namely, substantive 
judgments regarding freedom-of-contract values and judgments about 
interaction of those values with the Roberts Court’s views about the value of 
private enforcement of remedial regimes in arbitration. 
As to the former, untethered from the FAA or the underlying substantive 
liability rules, the freedom of contract interpretation of the FAA reflects the 
Court’s independent substantive policy judgment about the value of freedom 
of contract for its own sake. Indeed, such a judgment aligns with the Roberts 
Court’s overall trend, across various substantive areas of the law, towards 
unfettered freedom of contract.137 
Second, the Court appears to have made an additional substantive judgment 
that, on balance, freedom of contract values outweigh whatever values the Court 
ascribes to private enforcement through arbitration, or perhaps more forcefully, 
freedom-of-contract values serve the broader anti-litigation values evinced by 
the Roberts Court.138 To demonstrate, consider what typifies would-be class 
claims in arbitration: claims affected by arbitration contracts of adhesion are 
characteristically low-value, consumer-type claims.139 Even when these claims 
are “valuable,” as in Italian Colors, they are unmarketable on an individual 
basis.140 The cases are often lawyer-driven; a typical unsophisticated claimant 
 
“those rules of law which characteristically and reasonably affect people’s conduct at the stage of 
primary activity” (footnote omitted)). 
137 See generally TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 120; Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court v. 
America, DEMOCRACY J. (2012), democracyjournal.org/magazine/23/the-roberts-court-v-
america/ [https://perma.cc/GK6U-5LGM] (explaining that the Roberts Court uses the First 
Amendment to craft free-market jurisprudence). 
138 See, e.g., STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: 
THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 137-38, 142-43, 151, 173-81 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) (presenting an account of the Roberts Court’s tendency toward 
restricting litigation and private enforcement as well as tracking the Supreme Court’s increased 
tendency toward litigation restriction since 1960); TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 120 (describing the 
Roberts Court’s procedural jurisprudence as pro-corporate and anti–private enforcement). 
139 See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 1, at 375 (predicting that the class action waiver provisions will 
doom the remaining class actions, which are contract-based and “virtually all consumer class actions”). 
140 See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F. 3d 300, 303, 317 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting 
that the “small individual damages award is not going to pay for the expert fees . . . necessary to make 
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may not even know she has a claim.141 Further, the Court’s references to in 
terrorem effects belie a judgment that the sorts of cases in arbitration lack 
merit.142 Indeed, the interaction between the operation of the substantive 
remedial regimes in arbitration on the one hand and class procedures on the 
other would, to some members of the Roberts Court, be a negative one. So 
beneath the formalism in language, it is the Court’s composite judgment 
regarding the interaction of class action procedures with low-value claims, 
unsophisticated parties, and lawyer-driven suits, and not the interaction of 
class procedures with the “nature” of arbitration under the FAA, that 
produces the deleterious effects of the class action the Court seems so 
determined to eliminate. 
 
*      *      * 
In short, the Court’s recent class action jurisprudence is lacking in class 
action coherence. Instead, it is rife with the selective invocation of stock 
arguments against the class action, deployed when the Court has concluded, 
often implicitly, that the interaction of underlying substantive rules with the 
class action would interfere with separate, substantive policy judgments the 
Court wishes to advance. The reality of the Court’s analysis in class action cases 
is therefore in tension with its methodological tendency toward procedural 
formalism.143 The next Part addresses two implications of that reality. 
 
an individual plaintiff ’s case” and that claims are not pursuable “where the expected recovery is 
dwarfed by the cost of litigating or arbitrating the claim” (citing Glover, supra note 50, at 1746-47)). 
141 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 
2046-47 (2010) (arguing class action lawyers are undercompensated, particularly in small-stakes class 
actions which are about deterrence, not about compensation to plaintiffs with small-value claims they 
typically do not even become aware of until notice of class settlement); see also CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK 
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) at 110-11 (2015), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZQ5A-U32J] (reporting results of a study of credit card contracts with pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses showing that fewer than 20% of respondents recognize that the clause impacts their 
right to a jury trial and only “13% understood that the contract they had just been shown prohibited 
them from participating in a class action lawsuit.”). 
142 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011) (stating that “class 
arbitration would be no different” in presenting “the risk of ‘in terrorem’ settlements that class 
actions entail”). 
143 See Wolff, supra note 18, at 1069 (noting that, in general, the “success of the Federal Rules 
has produced an ever-greater alienation from substantive values in procedural analysis”). 
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT’S “NON-TRANSSUBSTANTIVE” 
CLASS ACTION JURISPRUDENCE FOR JUDICIAL LAWMAKING  
POWER AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
The Supreme Court’s recent class action jurisprudence involves a series 
of substantive law and policy choices that drive the procedural outcomes. This 
dynamic presents a number of implications: for separation of powers; 
federalism; public and private values of judicial precedent; class action 
advocacy; notions of transsubstantive procedure; and the nature and 
legitimacy of the judicial role. This Part will focus on two—judicial 
lawmaking power and the judicial role. 
A. Implications for Judicial Lawmaking Power 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are often described as “transsubstantive,” 
a term classically defined to mean that the same procedural rules should apply, in 
the same way, across different substantive contexts.144 This transsubstantivity 
principle is said to reflect the dictate of the Enabling Act, which requires that 
procedural rules “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”145 The 
precise definition, commands, and normative valence of the transsubstantivity 
principle have long been debated.146 Descriptively, though, a fulsome 
conception of the transsubstantivity principle undergirds much of the 
Supreme Court’s “procedural” and Enabling Act jurisprudence. 
In this jurisprudence, comprised largely of diversity cases involving the Erie 
doctrine,147 the Court erects a wall between “procedure” and “substance.”148 The 
 
144 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 
DUKE L.J. 597, 617-18 (2010) (noting that the “structure of the rulemaking process was designed to encourage 
the making of transsubstantive rules”); Marcus, supra note 11, at 1191 (“The term ‘trans-substantive’ refers to 
doctrine that, in form and manner of application, does not vary from one substantive context to the 
next.”). Transsubstantive procedural rules do not preclude consideration of substantive law; rather, 
they tend to lead analysis in that direction. See Cover, supra note 11, at 721 (conceding that 
“procedure, broadly conceived, will inevitably shape substance”). 
145 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
146 See generally David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal 
Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010). 
147 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Enabling Act is usually invoked as a 
safeguard of federalism in diversity cases, and not as a restraint in federal question cases. See, e.g., 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965) (noting Erie’s admonition that “neither Congress nor 
the federal courts can . . . fashion rules which are not supported by a grant of federal authority” 
since, absent such authority, “state law must govern because there can be no other law”); Stephen B. 
Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 693, 705 (1988) (commenting on “the possibility that the Court regards the Rules 
Enabling Act as irrelevant in federal question cases”). But see Wolff, supra note 18, at 1043 n.42 (noting 
that the “Dukes decision offers an implicit corrective” to this construction of the Enabling Act). 
148 See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 406-07 
(2010) (“In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress authorized this Court to promulgate rules of procedure 
2017] The Supreme Court's “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action 1655 
Court’s characterization of Rule 23 in Shady Grove is illustrative: There, the 
Court described Rule 23 as a mere joinder device with negligible impact on 
substantive remedial schemes.149 And the treatment of federal substantive rights 
in Italian Colors—namely, as merely formal rights—completes this picture.150 
The Court has strongly suggested that such formalism and rigid 
adherence to transsubstantivity is commended, if not required, by the 
Enabling Act.151 Under the Court’s formalistic conceptual construct, 
procedure may easily operate both transsubstantively and within the confines 
of the Enabling Act. 
As Part II reveals, the formalistic notion of transsubstantivity the Court 
so frequently invokes is an illusion. Let me be clear: Scholars have long 
argued that the line between substance and procedure is not, functionally or 
conceptually, as rigid as the Court maintains.152 What the analysis in Part II 
demonstrates, instead, is that the Court’s invocation of these fictive 
conceptual silos is itself fictive. To the extent the Court’s class action 
jurisprudence is driven by substantive judgments, however, has the Court run 
afoul of its judicial lawmaking power under the Enabling Act? 
 
. . . but with the limitation that those rules ‘shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right[.]’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b))); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (noting 
that “Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts . . . 
but it has never essayed to declare the substantive state law”). 
149 559 U.S. at 408 (deeming it “obvious that [r]ules allowing multiple claims . . . to be litigated 
together . . . . alter only how the claims are processed”); see Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington 
Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 20 (2010) (criticizing the 
rigid transsubstantivity of Shady Grove as “ignor[ing] the practical realities of the modern class action”). 
150 In finding that the class action prohibition at issue “merely limits arbitration to two 
contracting parties” and by describing statutory rights as merely a right to pursue that statutory 
right, even though that right may lack a procedural path to vindication, the Court drew a formalistic 
distinction between substantive rights on the one hand, and procedure on the other. Am. Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). In doing so, the Court jettisoned language, 
expressed in prior opinions, that it would strike down arbitration contract provisions that impaired 
parties’ ability to bring federal statutory claims. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (“Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party 
should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial 
remedies for the statutory rights at issue. Nothing, in the meantime, prevents a party from excluding 
statutory claims from the scope of an agreement to arbitrate.” (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967))). 
151 See supra note 147; see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 462 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (lamenting the Court’s mere “acknowledg[ment] that state procedural rules 
cannot . . . be permitted to interfere with . . . the federal court system”). 
152 See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 18, at 1028 (explaining that judges often engage in procedural 
decision-making, like Erie, with regard for “applicable liability policies”); Burbank & Wolff, supra 
note 149, at 51 (“Even Congress has learned the power of procedure and knows how to pursue or 
mask substantive aims in procedural dress.”); Marcus, supra note 146, at 401 (describing the “shadowy 
divide” between substance and procedure); Cover, supra note 11, at 721 (discussing the 
“substance-oriented manipulation of procedural components” often mentioned in Erie literature). 
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Not likely. At least not in federal question cases; perhaps not in diversity 
cases either (though this Article defers that latter question given the 
jurisdictional nature of the majority of class action cases).153 Further, in 
diversity cases, a strict divide between substance and procedure theoretically 
guards against the risk of federal court usurpation of states’ lawmaking power. 
In federal question cases, though, federal courts are constrained by the 
separation of powers between the federal judiciary and Congress,154 not 
federalism. Thus, in promulgating, interpreting, and applying federal rules of 
procedure, the Court may not “abridge, enlarge or modify” a substantive right 
Congress has created.155 Yet, in contradistinction to state substantive rights, 
federal courts are very much in the business of making, interpreting, and 
providing content to federal rights. It is arguably their duty to do so.156 The 
Enabling Act does not command a conception of transsubstantivity that 
precludes interpretation of federal substantive law. Instead, it commands the 
reverse: the Court cannot promulgate, interpret, or apply procedural law in 
ways that contravene congressional pronouncements. 
The contexts of Halliburton I, Amgen, and Halliburton II illustrate these 
separation-of-powers constraints. Congress addressed securities class actions 
in the PSLRA and SLUSA, and though that legislation largely restricted 
securities class actions, Congress compromised and left the Basic presumption 
untouched.157 Thus, had the Court overruled Basic in Halliburton II, or 
interpreted Rule 23 as requiring proof of loss-causation in Halliburton I, it 
 
153 See Burbank, supra note 147, at 705 (arguing that the Supreme Court has erred in suggesting 
that the Enabling Act is grounded only in federalism); Cover, supra note 11, at 718 (arguing that analysis 
of the Federal Rules must take into account their interaction with underlying substantive law). 
154 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 149, at 43 (arguing that, for the Enabling Act to work as a 
meaningful proscription on the Court’s lawmaking power in federal question cases, it must work to 
protect the “allocat[ion of] federal lawmaking between the Supreme Court and Congress”). See 
generally Burbank, supra note 77. 
155 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (holding that certification was 
impermissible because it would transgress the Enabling Act’s requirement that Federal Rules not 
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)(2012))); Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999) (noting that the application of a federal rule of procedure 
must not violate the terms of the Enabling Act). 
156 See Nagareda, supra note 19, at 106 (suggesting “that it is ‘emphatically the province and duty’ 
of the court ‘to say what the law is’ when the answer to that question will determine whether” to 
certify a putative class (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803))); Wolff, supra note 18, at 
1047 (arguing that, where ambiguities in, or outdated interpretations of, a federal statute bear on 
procedural questions, the Court should reexamine the underlying liability policy). This Article does 
not enter the long-standing, but orthogonal, debate about the appropriate constraints, constitutional 
or otherwise, on judicial lawmaking. For a thorough treatment of that debate, see generally Adam N. 
Steinman, A Constitution for Judicial Lawmaking, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 545 (2004). 
157 See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rebutting the Fraud on the Market 
Presumption in Securities Fraud Class Actions: Halliburton II Opens the Door, 5 MICH. BUS. & 
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 33, 40-41 (2015) (noting that PSLRA and SLUSA “have had little 
impact on curbing the filing of questionable securities fraud class actions”). 
2017] The Supreme Court's “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action 1657 
would have offended the separation-of-powers constraints of the Enabling 
Act. It is less likely that contrary Rule 23 holdings in either Amgen or 
Halliburton II would have led the Court adrift of the Enabling Act, though 
the Court was sensitive to the possibility.158  
From this formal separation-of-powers limitation on the Court’s 
procedural decisionmaking power emerges a theory of the scope of judicial 
procedural lawmaking power in federal question cases, embodied in a 
principle I term the principle of procedural symmetry. This principle not only 
helps capture the methodology at work in many of the class action cases, 
thereby reconciling the divergent results, but it also operationalizes the 
Enabling Act in federal question cases more broadly.159 The principle of 
procedural symmetry says that the Court cannot interpret or apply substantive 
law differently from one procedural context to the next. This is the inverse of 
the oft-cited transsubstantivity principle: that the same procedural rules 
should apply to all areas of substantive law.160 
In contrast with the commands of the transsubstantivity principle, it is 
perfectly acceptable under the symmetry principle—and the Enabling Act—for 
the same procedural rule to apply differently in different substantive contexts. 
Thus, the Court’s interpretation of Title VII in Dukes could permissibly 
impact the function of Rule 23(a) differently than would its interpretation of 
Rule 10b-5. Indeed, the new, transsubstantive “commonality” standard in Dukes 
will almost certainly apply differently in different substantive contexts—not 
as a matter of procedural form, but as a matter of procedural function. The 
Court in Dukes found that plaintiffs could not answer the question “apt to 
drive the resolution of the litigation”—“why was I disfavored”—through 
 
158 For instance, in rejecting defendants’ policy arguments as to why plaintiffs ought to be 
required to prove materiality at the class-certification stage to invoke the Basic presumption, the 
Court in Amgen made frequent references to Congress’s actions, inactions, and considerations in the 
passage of the PSLRA as they pertained to Basic. 133 S. Ct. 1134, 1200 (2013) (“Congress, we count 
it significant, has addressed the settlement pressures associated with securities-fraud class actions 
through means other than requiring proof of materiality at the class-certification stage.”). In 
enacting PSLRA, Congress recognized that although private securities fraud litigation furthers 
important public-policy interests, prime among them, deterring wrongdoing and providing 
restitution to defrauded investors, such lawsuits have also been subject to abuse, including the 
“extract[ion]” of “extortionate ‘settlements’” of frivolous claims. H.R. REP. NO. 104–369, at 31–32 
(1995) (Conf. Rep.). The PSLRA’s response to the perceived abuses was, inter alia, to “impos[e] 
heightened pleading requirements” for securities-fraud actions, “limit recoverable damages and 
attorney’s fees, provide a ‘safe harbor’ for forward-looking statements, impose new restrictions on 
the selection of (and compensation awarded to) lead plaintiffs, mandate imposition of sanctions for 
frivolous litigation, and authorize a stay of discovery pending resolution of any motion to dismiss.” 
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U. S. 71, 81–82 (2006); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u–4 (2006 ed. and Supp. V). Notably absent was any alteration of the Basic presumption. 
159 I save for future work the operationalizing of this principle across the Roberts Court’s 
procedural landscape and exploring its applicability and limitations in diversity cases. 
160 See Marcus, supra note 11, at 1191. 
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common proof.161 That formulation of its holding obscured the Court’s 
substantive judgment. Plaintiffs in Dukes had presented a common method 
for answering the very question the Court deemed critical to the case. The 
Court simply rejected it under 23(a). That rejection, however, presupposed a 
particular substantive judgment about how discrimination must be proved 
under Title VII. It is that substantive judgment that impeded class 
certification in Dukes, but perhaps not certification in other substantive 
contexts. And that substantive judgment likewise conforms to the dictates of 
the symmetry principle and the Enabling Act. 
Similarly, recall the Enabling Act analysis in Dukes. The Court rejected 
plaintiffs’ proposed “Trial by Formula” under Rule 23, because it would 
“abridge” defendants’ right to present individualized defenses.162 Yet this 
holding rests upon the Court’s implicit, substantive interpretation of section 
706(g) of Title VII: that the defendants’ right to show that an adverse 
employment action was non-discriminatory is the right to do so on an 
individual basis.163 The procedural consequences followed naturally from that 
substantive judgment—indeed, given the Court’s substantive judgment, a 
contrary result would have violated the Enabling Act. It likewise would have 
violated the symmetry principle: if defendants were entitled to present affirmative 
defenses to plaintiffs’ claims of employment discrimination in individual 
proceedings as a matter of Title VII law, then the change from an individual to a 
class proceeding could not change that substantive right. The limitations on the 
function of Rule 23 in Dukes thus stem from the dictates of the substantive law of 
Title VII, leaving open the possibility that the Court could affirm a Rule 23 “Trial 
by Formula” in a different substantive context—as it did in Tyson. 
Indeed, here Tyson is illuminating. If, as a matter of substantive law, 
plaintiffs in individual FLSA actions are entitled to the Mt. Clemens inference 
to establish liability, it would violate the Enabling Act to apply that 
substantive law differently just because the procedural context had changed 
to that of a class action. 
Of course, when the symmetry principle and the transsubstantivity 
principle collide, one must give. To illustrate, compare Tyson and Comcast. 
Recall that in Comcast, the Court held that, under Rule 23, a party’s damages 
 
161 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-52 (2011) (citing Nagareda, supra note 19, 
at 132). 
162 Id. at 367. 
163 See Wolff, supra note 18, at 1046 (noting that the Court’s chosen interpretation of section 
706(g) may have foreclosed nationwide certification, but that “there is room for disagreement” as to 
how heavy a burden on certification the text of section 706(g) necessarily imposes). 
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theory must align with its theory of liability.164 Taking the Comcast majority’s 
holding at face value—as a purely procedural, transsubstantive, holding—the 
Court in Tyson runs afoul of Comcast by holding that Rule 23(b)(3) does not 
require such alignment, at least in some substantive circumstances.165 Thus, 
either Comcast (which appears inconsistent with the symmetry principle) or 
Tyson (which appears inconsistent with the transsubstantivity principle) 
raises Enabling Act difficulties. Again: one principle must give. 
At least in federal question cases, the symmetry principle better 
safeguards both the separation-of-powers constraints and judicial federal 
lawmaking power than does rigid application of the transsubstantivity 
principle. Indeed, formalistic separation between procedure and substance in 
federal question cases tends to interfere with the Court’s substantive 
lawmaking power. More than that, and perhaps ironically, it is likelier to 
generate Enabling Act problems. 
Indeed, it is the holding in Comcast, not Tyson, that is potentially in 
tension with both the Court’s substantive lawmaking power and with the 
Enabling Act. Under the Enabling Act—and under the symmetry principle 
this Article offers to operationalize it—the Court may appropriately exercise 
its power to interpret federal substantive law,166 and, as in Tyson, derive its 
procedural holdings from the dictates of its substantive judgment about the 
FLSA. However, if Justice Breyer’s analysis of substantive antitrust law in 
Comcast is accurate—that it provides a bridge between plaintiffs’ theory of 
liability and their damages model—then the majority’s explicitly procedural 
holding in Comcast operates to “abridge” that right. Even if Justice Breyer’s 
analysis is ultimately deemed incorrect, the majority’s holding raises 
Enabling Act concerns as soon as it confronts a substantive judgment like the 
one rendered in Tyson. 
If that analysis is correct, what should become of the strength and scope 
of the transsubstantivity principle? Or of the rigid separation between 
substantive and procedural analysis deployed in service of it, at least in federal 
question cases? On the one hand, the Enabling Act demands adherence to 
one half of the transsubstantivity principle: namely, that procedural rules 
must be identical in form across substantive contexts. So the Court could not 
 
164 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (“There is no question that the 
model failed to measure damages resulting from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners’ 
liability in this action is premised.”). 
165 See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045-47 (2016) (upholding the use of 
representative evidence). 
166 To be clear, Tyson involved federal law—the FLSA—and Iowa state substantive law. 
Because Iowa law incorporated the FLSA, the Court’s interpretation of federal law did not risk 
offending the Enabling Act. See Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors in Support of 
Respondents at 5, Tyson, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (No. 14-1146) (arguing that “Tyson’s Rules Enabling Act 
argument fails even to engage with Iowa substantive law or the federal law it incorporates”). 
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declare that, for securities cases, Rule 23(a)’s “commonality” standard requires 
nothing more than the generation of, say, “questions of law or fact that relate 
to the same transaction or occurrence”—at least without overruling Dukes. 
Under the separation-of-powers limitations of the Enabling Act, however, 
the Court in federal question cases still has significant room to render 
judgments about the meaning and content of substantive law. And any one of 
these substantive judgments may affect the function of a procedural rule in 
that particular substantive context, but not in others. Therefore, while the 
Court could not issue a different interpretation of Rule 23(a) for securities cases 
without overruling Dukes, it could—and did—interpret the securities laws and 
the FLSA in ways that make the application of Rule 23’s identical-in-form 
commonality and predominance standards much less onerous as a functional 
matter. The Enabling Act limitation here does not derive from the principle 
of transsubstantivity, but from the principle of procedural symmetry: 
Variances in the application of procedural rules are perfectly appropriate, so 
long as they stem from the dictates of substantive rules. Variances in 
application of substantive law in different procedural contexts are not. 
Though this discussion has necessarily been abbreviated, even this brief 
exploration reveals two key insights: First, despite the Court’s invocation of 
language to the contrary, rigid separation of substance and procedure, and 
strict adherence to the transsubstantivity principle, is not shorthand for 
“Enabling Act compliant,” at least in federal question cases. Second, such 
formalism is, in fact, a potential recipe for bad procedural holdings—holdings 
that, at least in later cases, must be re-interpreted or otherwise manipulated 
to avoid “abridg[ing], modify[ing], or enlarg[ing]” a federal substantive right; 
holdings that obscure, rather than clarify, the dictates of substantive law; 
holdings that threaten judicial legitimacy by generating doctrinal and 
jurisprudential incoherence. To the extent the Court might be criticized for 
being “non-transsubstantive,” it should take it as a compliment. 
 
*      *      * 
Absent from the foregoing analysis is an exploration of the possible 
valence of the symmetry principle in class arbitration decisions. That 
omission was purposeful. The arbitration cases do not directly raise Enabling 
Act questions: at least in federal question cases, any conflicts are largely 
between one federal statute (the FAA) and another (say, the Sherman Act). 
However, that arbitration jurisprudence bears brief mention here, for two 
reasons. One, like the Rule 23 cases, the arbitration cases implicate 
separation-of-powers limitations on the Court’s lawmaking authority. Two, 
the Court in the arbitration cases deploys the procedural formalism and 
transsubstantivity found throughout the Court’s procedural jurisprudence. 
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Indeed, the Court’s approach to conflicts between the FAA and other 
substantive federal statutes has its intellectual foundation in—and striking 
conceptual similarity to—its formalistic approach to substance and procedure 
in its Erie jurisprudence. Start with Justice Kagan’s dissent in Italian Colors. 
She notes that, when two federal statutes collide, the substantive statute (the 
Sherman Antitrust Act) should trump the statute governing procedural 
matters (the FAA).167 This interpretive principle is rooted in the same 
separation-of-powers concerns that guide procedural interpretation under the 
Enabling Act. The majority does not deny the principle’s existence; it denies 
its relevance.168 As in Shady Grove and Comcast, the majority in Italian Colors 
avoids the principle’s limitation by avoiding the conflict.169 
In Italian Colors, the majority silos off the procedural statute (the FAA) 
from the substantive one, defining the latter only as a formal right.170 This 
formalistic definition of a substantive right explicitly rejects any consideration 
of the interaction between substantive rights and procedures.171 So 
conceptualized, arbitration procedures do not, and likely cannot as a conceptual 
matter, interfere with a substantive right.172 This move should sound familiar: 
it is the same one the Court made in Shady Grove and Comcast.173 
The rigid formalism used in Italian Colors, however, did more than obscure 
substantive judgments. It also provided the majority with an end-run around 
 
167 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313-20 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
168 See id. at 2320 (noting that the “effective-vindication rule comes into play . . . when the 
FAA is alleged to conflict with another federal law, like the Sherman Act here”). 
169 Id. at 2317, 2320 (stating that “[t]he majority is quite sure that the effective-vindication rule 
does not apply here, but has precious little to say about why. It starts by disparaging the rule as 
having ‘originated as dictum.’” (quoting id. at 2310)); accord Comcast, 569 U.S. at 1433 (“This case 
. . . turns on the straightforward application of class-certification principles; it provides no occasion 
for . . . discussion of substantive antitrust law.”); Shady Grove, 559 U.S. 393, 401-04 (2010) (“We need 
not decide whether a state law that limits the remedies available in an existing class action would 
conflict with Rule 23; that is not what § 901(b) does.”). 
170 See Glover, supra note 51, at 3077 (explaining the Court’s “effective reduction of substantive 
legal obligations to purely formal rights”). 
171 Indeed, the Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit’s decision striking down the 
class action prohibition on the grounds that the interaction of the class action, the class action 
provision, and plaintiffs’ substantive rights under federal statute was one of effectively eliminating 
those statutory rights. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 304, 312 (finding 
that plaintiffs demonstrated that the class-waiver provision “would effectively preclude any action 
seeking to vindicate the statutory rights asserted by” them while noting the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of “utility of the class action as a vehicle for vindicating statutory rights . . . . 
[particularly since] the class action device is the only economically rational alternative”). 
172 See Glover, supra note 51, at 3073 (noting that, after Italian Colors, the only impermissible 
contract provision is one expressly banning suits under a particular federal statute). 
173 See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433 (finding that the case “provides no occasion for the dissent’s 
extended discussion . . . of substantive antitrust law” where Rule 23 law consideration was separate 
from interaction with it); Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 401-04 (finding that Rule 23 did not conflict with 
a New York state law and thus that the Court “need not decide whether a state law that limits the 
remedies available in an existing class action would conflict with Rule 23”). 
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a collision between its procedural holding and federal substantive law. 
Perhaps that explains the absence of explicit exploration of substantive 
judgments in the Court’s class arbitration opinions. That is troubling on its 
own terms. The takeaway for judicial lawmaking power, and the insight that 
provides a conceptual bridge between the class arbitration and Rule 23 cases, 
is that rigid transsubstantivity can threaten, rather than safeguard, 
separation-of-powers values. 
Indeed, that threat manifests itself concretely at the intersection of the pro–class 
action cases and the class arbitration cases. The theoretical underpinnings of 
the symmetry principle would seem to require the Court to strike down 
provisions in an arbitration contract that prohibited the use of statistical 
evidence, the Basic presumption, and—at least under the FLSA—a collective 
action procedure. But would the Court’s deeper substantive judgments about 
adopting class-facilitative rules in those remedial schemes carry any weight? 
More fundamentally, given the Court’s formalism in the class arbitration 
cases, would anything about the underlying substantive laws in Tyson or Amgen 
or Halliburton II matter at all? And if not, how damning—or not—is that for 
rigid transsubstantivity? 
 
*      *      * 
The Court’s rigid transsubstantive formalism tends to obscure judgments 
about the interaction between substantive and procedural law. It also obscures 
the cases themselves: by emphasizing the “procedural” features of those cases, 
the opinions tend to repel public interest and media scrutiny.174 The next 
Section briefly explores some possible implications of this lack of 
transparency for the judicial role and judicial legitimacy. 
B. Transparency, the Judicial Role, and Judicial Legitimacy 
If the Court can exercise substantive lawmaking power in a way that 
expressly acknowledges the interrelationship between substance and 
procedure without offending the Enabling Act, why does it largely avoid doing 
so? On one level, a question like this cannot be fully answered. The Court is 
not a unitary or monolithic entity, much less a static one—nor should it be. 
However, exploring possible explanations for this phenomenon is revealing, 
less as a matter of attempting to achieve the impossible task of accurate judicial 
mind-reading, but more as a means for considering the normative valence of 
this non-transparency for the judicial role and judicial legitimacy. 
 
174 See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 70, at 299 (hypothesizing that, when “the Court is 
engaged in apparently technical and legalistic decision making,” the public pays little attention to 
its work). 
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One possible, and partial, explanation is path dependency: the formalism 
already pervasive in the Court’s procedural jurisprudence colors and 
constrains the Court’s approach to the questions presented, petitions for writs 
of certiorari, and briefs in “procedural” cases. Those questions, petitions, and 
briefs are then colored and constrained by the Court’s formalistic opinions. 
The history of Halliburton II supports this hypothesis. Defendants had 
already tried and failed to rearrange the litigation landscape of securities fraud 
through largely procedural arguments in Halliburton I and Amgen. But in 
Halliburton II, defendants launched an offensive against the fraud-on-the-market 
theory itself, leaving the Court no choice but to confront the substantive question 
head on.175 And it was not until Tyson that one side’s briefs’ lead arguments 
urged the Court to make substantive law determinations to drive the 
procedural outcome.176 Such arguments departed markedly not only from 
those in prior class action cases, but also from those in the petition for writ 
of certiorari in Tyson itself.177 Indeed, these arguments took Tyson itself by 
surprise.178 
A second set of less provable, but still rather plausible, hypotheses posit 
that the Court maintains its rigid substance/procedure dichotomy for more 
strategic reasons related to preserving its institutional power. For starters, 
 
175 In both Halliburton I and Amgen, the Court was presented with arguments aimed at ratcheting 
up the requirements for plaintiffs seeking to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance 
in order to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3). See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013) (focusing on whether 
materiality needed to be proved to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)); see also Halliburton I, 563 U.S. 807, 807 (2011) 
(focusing on whether loss causation needed to be proved to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)). In both of these 
cases, arguments assumed the continued viability of the substantive Basic presumption and focused 
within the procedural parameters of Rule 23(b)(3). After those procedural arguments failed, 
securities-fraud defendants were left with arguments—urged by the dissent in Amgen—that attacked 
the substantive Basic presumption itself. Thus, in Halliburton II, the questions presented directly 
challenged the continued viability of the Basic presumption, forcing the Court to take that substantive 
question head-on. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405 (2014) (“The questions presented are 
whether we should overrule or modify Basic’s presumption of reliance . . . .”). 
176 The pre-Tyson class action briefs largely focused on Rule 23 and the class action. See, e.g., 
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 21, Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (No. 11-864) (arguing that Rule 23 
precluded plaintiffs’ damages model); Reply Brief for Petitioner, Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (No. 10-277) 
(focusing in its entirety on certification’s impermissibility under Rule 23). 
177 In Tyson, plaintiffs changed argument strategy between the time of filing their opposition 
to the petition for writ of certiorari and the filing of their merits brief, shifting from Rule 23-centric 
arguments to arguments centered on Mt. Clemens. Compare Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, Tyson 
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) (No. 14-1146) (arguing that petitioner’s objection 
to the use of representative proof was waived and thus did not warrant review), with Brief for 
Respondents, Tyson, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (No. 14-1146) (focusing on the permissibility of the use of 
representative proof, in the form of class-wide approximations of employee compensable time, 
under Mt. Clemens’s inferential proof standard). 
178 See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 3, 5, Tyson, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (No. 14-1146) (characterizing 
respondents’ Mt. Clemens arguments as “smokescreens [that] lack merit” and contending that, in any 
event, respondents waived the point “by not raising it when opposing certiorari”). 
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transsubstantivity—or at least the illusion thereof—can obviate (as in Italian 
Colors and Comcast) or obscure (as in Dukes, Amgen, and Tyson) otherwise 
permissible substantive lawmaking.179 This is lawmaking the Court may well 
not wish to draw significant attention to for any number of reasons, including 
a protectionist attitude toward its own institutional power.180 Relatedly, the 
illusion of transsubstantivity may prevent substantive judgments from 
extending beyond a single “procedural” opinion. For instance, perhaps the 
Court in Dukes did not want to issue a precedential statement on Title VII 
law. On both of these scores, and particularly if the Court is engaged in some 
form of “revolution” in favor of business,181 blatant substantive law 
decisionmaking might draw too much unwanted public attention. 
The path dependency hypothesis, whatever its ultimate accuracy, seems 
insufficient to provide normative justification for nontransparency. To be 
sure, the Court ought not issue opinions on matters that are insufficiently 
briefed.182 But the Court could request briefing on underlying substantive 
issues in “procedural” cases—putting future advocates on notice about 
argument structure and content. Moreover, and particularly given the success 
of parties who wrote less transsubstantive briefs in cases like Tyson and 
Halliburton II, the Court may be forced into greater transparency in its 
procedural cases by way of advocacy. 
The normative valence of the institutional power hypothesis for the 
maintenance of transsubstantivity illusions is more difficult to gauge and 
warrants a more thorough exploration than can be provided here. 
Nevertheless, here are three initial considerations. First, and fundamentally, 
the judiciary has a role to “say what the law is” in matters of substantive 
 
179 See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 18, at 1046-47 (arguing that the Court in Dukes should not have 
obscured its analysis of the substantive law of Title VII). 
180 Unlike “procedural” opinions, the Court’s decisions on substantive matters are subject to 
higher levels of scrutiny by the public, the media, and Congress. In the wake of Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), for example—in which the Court explicitly interpreted the 
equal pay provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—public outcry was so great that Congress 
enacted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 to provide that the statute of limitations for filing 
equal pay claims resets with each new paycheck affected by the employer’s discriminatory action. 
Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 Stat. 5; see also Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/opinion/31thu1.html [https://perma.cc/LZG9-4VAM] (noting 
that “[f]ortunately, Congress can amend the law to undo this damaging decision” but “[i]t should do 
so without delay”). 
181 See Coates, supra note 46, at 28-31 (discussing the Roberts Court’s use of civil procedure to 
“cut back on civil litigation against business defendants”); Burbank & Farhang, supra note 70, at 299 
(arguing that the Court has focused on “procedural” decisions so as to avoid public notice and “erode[] 
the enforcement of federal rights”). 
182 See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (2013) (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion as “infected by our misguided reformulation of the 
question presented”). 
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liability policy, even in “procedural” cases.183 The Court’s substantive 
lawmaking role involves a mode of judicial reasoning that looks to the relevant 
statute’s text and legislative history and then balances various policy 
considerations, including: the rule’s regulatory goals and purposes; the effects 
the decision will have on plaintiffs, on defendants, and on the judicial system; 
and its interaction with various enforcement mechanisms. Resolving these 
substantive issues procedurally—with a measure of indifference to 
substantive law—raises concerns that the substantive issues will not be given 
the careful consideration they deserve. That lawmaking role—to provide 
careful and thorough reasons for its substantive judgments—is critical to 
notions of judicial legitimacy.184 
Second, the exercise of this lawmaking power is quite important in a world 
of litigation increasingly characterized by an absence of substantive 
content.185 The vast majority of cases are resolved before trial.186 To the 
extent cases generate precedent or substantive guidance, they frequently must 
do so through pretrial procedural decisionmaking. 
Third, the lack of explicit exercise of this lawmaking power produces 
confusion about the contours of substantive and procedural law. For example, 
we know (but only after Tyson) that Comcast likely cannot be interpreted as 
prohibiting any substantive rule that bridges the gap between liability and 
damages. But what sorts of factors should courts take into account in 
interpreting the scope of the proposed substantive “bridge” between liability 
and damages? Does it matter whether that bridge facilitates or frustrates the 
class action device? Can FLSA plaintiffs subject to an arbitration agreement 
banning class actions successfully invoke Tyson in their Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration? For that matter, can securities 
plaintiffs successfully invoke Halliburton II? And if so, must Italian Colors be 
overruled, or can it be limited—a la Comcast—as an abstract procedural case?187 
 
183 See supra note 156. 
184 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-65 (1992) (“The Court’s power 
lies, rather, in its legitimacy . . . . The underlying substance of this legitimacy . . . . is expressed in 
the Court’s opinions, and our contemporary understanding is such that a decision without principled 
justification would be no judicial act at all.”); Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give 
Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 496-500 (2015) (identifying 
the critical role judicial reasoning plays in supporting the legitimacy of democratic institutions). 
185 See generally Glover, supra note 34; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 
(1984); Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165. 
186 Glover, supra note 34 at 1720 (explaining that “trials . . . are now a rarity” and citing 
numerous empirical studies that trace the decline in trial rates since the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were enacted); Nagareda, supra note 19, at 130 (arguing settlement is the dominant 
endgame in litigation, and after class certification, there will likely be no trial). 
187 The drafters of the Sherman Antitrust Act specifically considered and rejected “an 
amendment that would have permitted a type of plaintiff class action in which liability would be 
determined as to a large group of plaintiffs but damages would be assessed to each individually.” 
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As a normative matter—and at least given Congress’s history of 
obfuscation and power-claiming through procedure—it is not entirely clear 
which way the balance cuts as between preserving the institutional power of 
the judiciary and compelling values of transparency. As a descriptive matter, 
it is rather unlikely that the Roberts Court would find these three normative 
concerns about the judicial role and judicial legitimacy compelling enough to 
abandon all future uses of the transsubstantivity curtain—though increased 
“non-transsubstantive” advocacy might well drag the Court’s substantive 
judgments into the light. That said, it might not be wholly unreasonable to 
suggest they not go out of their way to trample over these normative concerns 
as they arguably did by granting certiorari in Comcast. Indeed, whatever the 
right balance, ultimately, it is the Court itself that possesses the ultimate 
power to strike it. 
 
*      *      * 
The Supreme Court’s recent class action opinions, taken at face value, 
might suggest that the Court is either lost at sea or irredeemably political in 
its class action jurisprudence. Though these cases can be better understood 
by the substantive judgments this Article reveals, the lack of transparency 
about those judgments lends credence to the most cynical views of judicial 
lawmaking. It reinforces the notion that procedural lawmaking is nothing 
more than a battleground in the waging of a different war: over the value of 
certain substantive laws, certain claimants, and private enforcement itself. 
Though swinging the transparency pendulum in the precise opposite 
direction may be a step too far given the need for the judiciary to preserve 
institutional power, the important concerns regarding the judicial role and 
 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 25 (1989) (describing efforts 
by members of Congress to amend the Sherman Antitrust Act to provide a class action mechanism); 
see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (noting that Congress rejected proposals 
to include a class action or collective action provision in the Sherman Antitrust Act). 
This is an argument American Express raised in its petition for a writ of certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari , Am. Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133), and in even more detail in its opening 
brief. See Brief for Petitioners at 6, Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (No. 12-133). 
In particular, American Express pointed out that, when the Sherman Antitrust Act was being 
debated, Senator James Z. George of Mississippi proposed an amendment that would allow a class 
action in which liability is determined in regard to a “large group of plaintiffs,” but damages are 
assessed to each plaintiff individually. Hovenkamp, supra note 187, at 25. In support of his 
amendment, Senator George argued that such an amendment was needed for the vindication of 
small claims—claims so small as not to justify the expense and trouble of a suit in a distant court. 
Id. at 24-25. Other such comments abounded. Id. at 25-26. Congress ultimately rejected Senator 
George’s amendment. Id. at 25; Reiter, 442 U.S. at 343. 
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the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking call for a better balance to be struck in 
the Court’s procedural decisionmaking. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article began with an inquiry that has dominated class action 
discussions for the past six years: does the Roberts Court’s class action 
jurisprudence evince an intent to destroy the class action? The answer, to 
some degree, is yes. But the jurisprudence cannot be fully explained by a 
monolithic theory about the Court’s view of class actions. The Court’s 
holdings in this area are better seen as reflecting the Court’s implicit, 
substantive lawmaking and its willingness, or not, to adopt substantive rules 
and policies that facilitate class actions.  
As a theoretical matter, the class action jurisprudence under the Roberts 
Court may actually have opened a window of promise for Rule 23, the class 
action, and procedural lawmaking more generally. Despite its shortcomings, 
the Court’s class action jurisprudence portends a welcome shift: A shift from 
procedural analysis, wholly divorced from substantive considerations, to 
analysis interwoven with and driven by judgments regarding substantive law, 
rules, and policy. A shift to what perhaps “procedural” analysis was always 
meant to be: (transparently) “non-transsubstantive.”188  
 
 
188 See, e.g., Burbank & Wolff, supra note 149, at 48 (identifying the Federal Rules as only 
“superficially transsubstantive”); Cover, supra note 11, at 732-33 (questioning the utility of 
transsubstantivity and asking in what sense the Federal Rules work, not “because of its trans-substantive 
aspiration,” but “in spite of it”). 
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